

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ON THE THEME OF THE NLS CONGRESS 2025

PAINFUL LOVES



BIBLIOGRAPHY “PAINFUL LOVES”



Caravaggio, *Amor vincit omnia*

Over the last few months, colleagues, all with a close link to the NLS, have been delving into the publications of Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller and Eric Laurent. Numerous quotations have been extracted within these 6 rubrics:

- [Grief and Break-Ups](#)
- [Monstrous Loves](#)
- [Love Prevented](#)
- [Love and discourse](#)
- [Man, Woman and Love](#)
- [Love, Knowledge and Truth](#)

This bibliography has many strings to its bow. So no, not one straight arrow that would allow one to hit the target. Instead, some hints and clues to help find one's way around the theme of the Congress, through an article for the Blog or the presentation of a case at the parallel clinical sessions in Paris.

We have opted for a double bibliography, one in English and the other in French, so as not to make it too cumbersome to use. However, these two versions are not mirror images of each other. Each retains its own particularity, depending on what is found in the two languages.

Don't delay in discovering it!

GRIEF AND BREAK-UPS



Caravaggio, *San Giovanni alla fontana*

FREUD

[...] this disappointment in her first love still hurt her. The contrast between the blissful feelings she had allowed herself to enjoy [...] and the worsening of her father's state [...] constituted a conflict, a situation of incompatibility. [...] the erotic idea was repressed from association and the affect attaching to that idea was used to intensify or revive a physical pain.

Freud, S., "Studies on Hysteria" (1895) - Miss Elisabeth von R., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 146.

The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but otherwise the features are the same. Profound mourning, the reaction to the loss of someone who is loved, contains the same painful frame of mind, the same loss of interest in the outside world—in so far as it does not recall him—the same loss of capacity to adopt any new object of love (which would mean replacing him) and the same turning away from any activity that is not connected with thoughts of him.

Freud, S., "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 244.

Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object. This demand arouses understandable opposition—it is a matter of general observation that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them.

Ibid., p. 244.

The loss of a love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and come into the open. Where there is a disposition to obsessional neurosis the conflict due to ambivalence gives a pathological cast to mourning and forces it to express itself in the form of self-reproaches to the effect that the mourner himself is to blame for the loss of the loved object, i.e. that he has willed it.

Ibid., pp. 250-251.

In mania, the ego must have got over the loss of the object (or its mourning over the loss, or perhaps the object itself), and thereupon the whole quota of anticathexis which the painful suffering of melancholia had drawn to itself from the ego and 'bound' will have become available [...] Moreover, the manic subject plainly demonstrates his liberation from the object which was the cause of his suffering, by seeking like a ravenously hungry man for new object-cathexes.

Ibid., pp. 253, 256.

So by taking flight into the ego, love escapes extinction. [...] It is possible for the process in the Ucs to come to an end, either after the fury has spent itself or after the object has been abandoned as valueless.

Ibid., p. 257.

It is easy to see that essentially it is compounded of grief, the pain caused by the thought of losing the loved object, and of the narcissistic wound, in so far as this is distinguishable from the other wound; further, of feelings of enmity against the successful rival, and of a greater or lesser amount of self-criticism which tries to hold the subject's own ego accountable for his loss.

Freud, S., "Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality" (1922), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XVIII, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 223.

LACAN

On the last page of the edition of *Et nunc manet in te* which includes the pages that complete the *Journal* regarding relations between Gide and Madeleine, we find the following phrase at the end of lines that make our head spin: "which offers nothing more, in the ardent place of the heart, than a hole." It seems to us to pin the lover's plaintive cry to the place in the living heart that has been emptied of the beloved being. However, we have incorrectly read this: What is at stake is the void left in the text of the *Journal* for the reader by the suppression of the pages that are restored in this new edition. But it is in reading incorrectly that we have nevertheless read correctly.

It is thus here that Gide's irony, which would be almost unique were it not for Heine, breaks down when he evokes the deadly touch with which love was marked for him, this "No, we

will not be true lovers, my dear," whose tone Delay highlights in Gide's notebook entry from January 3, 1891, following its path and aftermath in his papers and works.

Lacan, J., "The Youth of Gide," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 641.

Physiology shows that pain has a longer cycle than pleasure in every respect, since a stimulation provokes pain at the point at which pleasure stops. However, prolonged one assumes it to be, pain, like pleasure, nevertheless comes to an end—when the subject passes out.

Lacan, J., "Kant with Sade", *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 653.

There is a radical difference between, on the one hand, the gift as a sign of love, which aims radically at something else that lies beyond, namely the mother's love, and on the other hand, whichever object that might arise for the satisfaction of the child's needs.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The Object Relation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, 2020, p. 117.

The frustration of love and the frustration of jouissance are two distinct things. The frustration of love is pervaded by all the intersubjective relationships that can be continued thereafter. Meanwhile, the frustration of jouissance is on no account pervaded by just anything, contrary to what people say.

***Ibid.*, p. 118.**

Whenever there is a frustration of love, this is compensated by the satisfaction of need. It is in so far as the mother is missing for the child that calls out to her, that he clings to her breast and turns it into something more significant than anything else (...) Here the satisfaction of need is both a compensation for the frustration of love and, I would almost say the beginning of the distraction from it.

***Ibid.*, p. 167.**

The problem of mourning is the problem of maintaining, at the scopic level, the bonds whereby desire is suspended, not from the object a, but from i(a), by which all love is narcissistically structured in so far as the term love implies the idealized dimension I spoke about. This is what makes for the difference between what occurs in mourning and what occurs in melancholia and mania.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 335.

LAURENT

Love is a strange feeling which can manifest itself in a deferred manner and after attempts to break up (*rupture*).

Laurent, E., "Europe Through the Ordeal of Hate (Part II)", *The Lacanian Review*, No 9, 2020, p. 257.

MONSTROUS LOVES



Caravaggio, *The Sacrifice of Isaac*

FREUD

It is also through the medium of this connection between libido and cruelty that the transformation of love into hate takes place, the transformation of affectionate into hostile impulses, which is characteristic of a great number of cases of neurosis, and indeed, it would seem, of paranoia in general.

Freud, S., “Three Essays on Sexuality” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 167.

If these two factors [*frustration in reality* and amount of *attraction*] are sufficiently strong, the general mechanism by which the neuroses are formed comes into operation. The libido turns away from reality, is taken over by imaginative activity (the process of introversion), strengthens the images of the first sexual objects and becomes fixated to them.

Freud, S., “On the Universal Tendency of Debasement in the Sphere of Love” (1912), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume X*, London: Hogarth Press, 1959, p. 182.

The obstacle raised against incest, however, compels the libido that has turned to these objects to remain in the unconscious.

***Ibid.*, p. 182.**

In this way it can happen that the whole of a young man's sensuality becomes tied to incestuous objects in the unconscious or to put it another way, becomes fixated to unconscious incestuous phantasies. The result is then total impotence, which is perhaps

further ensured by the simultaneous onset of an actual weakening of the organs that perform the sexual act.

***Ibid.*, p. 182.**

The sexual activity of such people shows the clearest signs, however, that it has not the whole psychical driving force of the instinct behind it. It is capricious, easily disturbed, often not properly carried out, and not accompanied by much pleasure. But above all it is forced to avoid the affectionate current. A restriction has thus been placed on object-choice. The sensual current that has remained active seeks only objects which do not recall the incestuous figure forbidden to it; if someone makes an impression that might lead to a high psychical estimation of her, this impression does not find an issue in any sensual excitation but in affection which has no erotic effect.

***Ibid.*, p. 182-183.**

The whole sphere of love in such people remains divided in the two directions personified in art as sacred and profane (or animal) love. Where they love they do not desire and where they desire they cannot love.

***Ibid.*, p. 183.**

The main protective measure against such a disturbance which men have recourse to in this split in their love consists in a psychical debasement of the sexual object, the overvaluation that normally attaches to the sexual object being reserved for the incestuous object and its representatives.

***Ibid.*, p. 183.**

The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favour of an object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoic's phantasy (or self-perception) of the 'end of the world'.

Freud, S., "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 76.

Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents' narcissism born again, which, transformed into object-love, unmistakably reveals its former nature.

***Ibid.*, p. 91.**

Loving in itself, in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers self-regard; whereas being loved, having one's love returned, and possessing the loved object, raises it once more. When libido is repressed, the erotic cathexis is felt as a severe depletion of the ego, the satisfaction of love is impossible, and the re-enrichment of the ego can be effected only by a withdrawal of libido from its objects. The return of the object-libido to the ego and its transformation into narcissism represents, as it were, a happy love once more; and, on the other hand, it is also true that a real happy love corresponds to the primal condition in which object-libido and ego-libido cannot be distinguished.

***Ibid.*, p. 99.**

The sexual ideal may enter into an interesting auxiliary relation to the ego ideal. It may be used for substitutive satisfaction where narcissistic satisfaction encounters real hindrances. In

that case a person will love in conformity with the narcissistic type of object-choice, will love what he once was and no longer is, or else what possesses the excellences which he never had at all.

The formula parallel to the one there stated runs thus: what possesses the excellence which the ego lacks for making it an ideal, is loved. This expedient is of special importance for the neurotic, who, on account of his excessive object cathexes, is impoverished in his ego and is incapable of fulfilling his ego ideal.

He then seeks a way back to narcissism from his prodigal expenditure of libido upon objects, by choosing a sexual ideal after the narcissistic type which possesses the excellences to which he cannot attain.

***Ibid.*, p. 100.**

Loss of love and failure leave behind them a permanent injury to self-regard in the form of a narcissistic scar, which in my opinion [...] contributes more than anything to the 'sense of inferiority' which is so common in neurotics.

Freud, S., "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 20-21.

In the first phases of erotic life, ambivalence is evidently the rule, many people retain this archaic trait all through their lives, it is characteristic of obsessional neurotics that in their object-relationships love and hate counterbalance each other.

Freud, S., "Female Sexuality" (1931), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 235.

The reproach against the mother which goes back furthest is that she gave the child too little milk – which is construed against her as a lack of love.

Freud, S., "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: Lecture XXXIII, Femininity" (1933), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 122.

A child's demands for love are immoderate, they make exclusive claims and tolerate no sharing.

***Ibid.*, p. 123.**

One would judge, if so, that the estrangement follows inevitably from the nature of children's sexuality, from the immoderate character of their demand for love and the impossibility of fulfilling their sexual wishes.

***Ibid.*, p. 123-124.**

A powerful tendency to aggressiveness is always present beside a powerful love, and the more passionately a child loves its object the more sensitive does it become to disappointments and frustrations from that object; and in the end the love must succumb to the accumulated hostility.

***Ibid.*, p. 124.**

Next come the sadists, puzzling people whose tender endeavours have no other aim than to cause pain and torment to their object, ranging from humiliation to severe physical injuries; and, as though to counterbalance them, their counterparts, the masochists, whose only

pleasure it is to suffer humiliations and torments of every kind from their loved object either symbolically or in reality.

Freud, S., "Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, no XX: The Sexual Life of Human Beings" (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVI*, London: Hogarth Press, 196), p. 306.

Megalomania is in every way comparable to the familiar sexual overvaluation of the object in [normal] erotic life. In this way for the first time we learnt to understand a trait in a psychotic illness by relating it to normal erotic life.

Freud, S., "Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis", no XVI: Libido Theory and Narcissism (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVI*, London. Hogarth Press, 1963, p. 415.

On the contrary, it is probable that this narcissism is the universal and original state of things, from which object-love is only later developed, without the narcissism necessarily disappearing on that account.

***Ibid.*, p. 416.**

it is possible to be egoistic and at the same time to be excessively narcissistic-that is to say, to have very little need for an object, (...), which we are occasionally in the habit of contrasting with "sensuality" under the name of 'love'.

***Ibid.*, p. 417.**

When someone is completely in love, however, altruism converges with libidinal object-cathexis. As a rule the sexual object attracts a portion of the ego's narcissism to itself, and this becomes noticeable as what is known as the 'sexual overvaluation' of the object.

***Ibid.*, p. 418.**

A melancholic propensity to suicide is also made more intelligible if we consider that the patient's embitterment strikes with a single blow at his own ego and at the loved and hated object.

***Ibid.*, p. 427.**

...patients suffering from paranoia are struggling against an intensification of their homosexual trends – a fact pointing back to a narcissistic object-choice. And a further interpretation had been made: that the persecutor is at bottom someone whom the patient loves or has loved in the past.

Freud, S., "A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease" (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 265.

Jealousy is one of those affective states, like grief, that may be described as normal. If anyone appears to be without it, the inference is justified that is undergone severe repression and consequently plays all the greater part in his unconscious mental life. The instances of abnormally intense jealousy met with in analytic work reveal themselves as constructed of three layers. The three layers or grades of jealousy may be described as (1) competitive or normal, (2) projected, and (3) delusional jealousy.

Freud, S., "Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality" (1922), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XVIII, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 223.

(. . .) A man will not only feel pain about the woman he loves and hatred of the man who is his rival, but also grief about the man, whom he loves unconsciously, and hatred of the woman as his rival.

***Ibid.*, p. 223.**

The jealousy of the second layer, *projected* jealousy, is derived in both men and women either from their own actual unfaithfulness in real life or from impulses towards it which have succumbed to repression. [. . .] The jealousy that arises from such a projection has, it is true, an almost delusional character; it is, however, amenable to the analytic work of exposing the unconscious phantasies of the subject's own infidelity. [. . .] In a delusional case one will be prepared to find jealousy belonging to all three layers, never to the third alone.

***Ibid.*, p. 224.**

We are reminded that sufferers from persecutory paranoia act in just the same way. They, too, cannot regard anything in other people as indifferent, and they, too, take up minute indications with which these other, unknown, people present them, and use them in their delusions of reference. The meaning of their delusion of reference is that they expect from all strangers something like love. But these people show them nothing of the kind.

***Ibid.*, p. 226.**

We begin to see that we describe the behavior of both jealous and persecutory paranoids very inadequately by saying that they project outwards on to others what they do not wish to recognize in themselves. Certainly, they do this; but they do not project it into the blue, so to speak, where there is nothing of the sort already. They let themselves be guided by their knowledge of the unconscious and displace to the unconscious minds of others the attention which they have withdrawn from their own.

***Ibid.*, p. 226.**

It is in sadism, where the death instinct twists the erotic aim in its own sense and yet at the same time fully satisfies the erotic urge, that we succeed in obtaining the clearest insight into its nature and its relation to Eros. But even where it emerges without any sexual purpose, in the blindest fury of destructiveness, we cannot fail to recognize that the satisfaction of the instinct is accompanied by an extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment, owing to its presenting the ego with a fulfillment of the latter's old wishes for omnipotence.

Freud, S., "Civilization and its Discontents" (1930), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XXI, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 101.

There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual instincts (. . .) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins: by taking himself, his own body, as his love-object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself as his object. This half-way phase between auto-erotism and object-love may perhaps be indispensable normally; but it appears that many people linger unusually long in this condition, and that many of its features are carried over by them into the later stages of their development.

Freud, S., “Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia” (1911), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XII, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp 60-61.

Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that the familiar principal forms of paranoia can all be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: ‘I (a man) love him (a man)’, and indeed that they exhaust all the possible ways in which such contradictions could be formulated. [. . .]

(a) Delusions of persecution; for they loudly assert: ‘I do not love him—I hate him.’ [. . .] The mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions—feelings—shall be replaced by external perceptions. [. . .] ‘I do not love him—I hate him, because HE PERSECUTES ME.’ [. . .]

(b) Another element is chosen for contradiction in erotomania [...] ‘I do not love him—I love her, because SHE LOVES ME [. . .]

(c) delusions of jealousy, which we can study in the characteristic forms in which they appear in each sex [. . .] ‘It is not I who love the man— she loves him’ [...] ‘It is not I who love the women—he loves them.’

***Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.**

‘I do not love at all—I do not love anyone.’ And since, after all, one’s libido must go somewhere, this proposition seems to be the psychological equivalent of the proposition: ‘I love only myself.’ So that this kind of contradiction would give us megalomania (...) Similarly, an individual’s megalomania is never so vehemently suppressed as when he is in the grip of an overpowering love.

***Ibid.*, p. 65.**

If one listens patiently to a melancholic’s many and various self-accusations, one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves or has loved or should love. [. . .] we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego.

Freud, S., “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XIV, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 248.

If the love for the object—a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up—takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies (...) a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject’s own self.

***Ibid.*, p. 251.**

Once we have admitted the idea of a fusion of the two classes of instincts [drives] with each other, [. . .] The sadistic component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example of a serviceable instinctual fusion; and the sadism which has made itself independent as a perversion would be typical of a defusion, though not one carried to extremes. [...] We perceive that for purposes of discharge the instinct of destruction is habitually brought into the service of Eros.

Freud, S., “The Ego and the Id” (1923), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, part IV, p. 41.*

For the opposition between the two classes of instincts we may put the polarity of love and hate. [. . .] Now, clinical observation shows not only that love is with unexpected regularity accompanied by hate, and not only that in human relationships hate is frequently a forerunner of love, but also that in a number of circumstances hate changes into love and love into hate.

***Ibid.*, p. 42-43.**

In persecutory paranoia the patient fends off an excessively strong homosexual attachment to some particular person in a special way; and as a result this person whom he loved most becomes the persecutor, against whom the patient directs an often dangerous aggressiveness. Here we have the right to interpolate a previous state which has transformed the love into hate. [. . .] violent feelings of rivalry are present which lead to aggressive inclinations, and that it is only after these have been surmounted that the formerly hated object becomes the loved one or gives rise to an identification.

***Ibid.*, p. 43.**

The ego deals with the first object cathexes of the id by taking over the libido from them into itself and binding it to the alteration of the ego produced by means of identification. The transformation [of erotic libido] into ego-libido of course involves an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualisation. [. . .] By thus getting hold of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as sole love-object, and desexualizing and sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual impulses. It has to acquiesce in some of the other object-cathexes of the id; it has, so to speak, to participate in them.

***Ibid.*, p. 45-46.**

LACAN

[...], by an odd symmetry, desire reverses the unconditionality of the demand for love, in which the subject remains subjected to the Other, in order to raise it to the power of an absolute condition (in which ‘absolute’ also implies ‘detachment’).

Lacan, J., “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 689.

In accordance with the mode of thought characteristic of obsessions, the image of the punishment at first engendered all kinds of fears in the subject, in particular that this punishment might one day be inflicted on the people most dear to him, notably either on that idealized figure of the poor woman to whom he devotes a love whose style and particular

importance we will examine shortly—the very sort of love which the obsessional subject is capable of—or, yet more paradoxically, on his father who, however, was dead at that time and reduced to a figure he imagines in the other world.

Lacan, J., “The Neurotic's Individual Myth,” *Psychoanalytical Quarterly* 48, no. 3, 1979, p. 412.

It is not ample for us to recognize what has befallen Lol, and which reveals what love is all about; i.e., this image, the self-image wherewith the other clads you and, which arrays you, and which leaves you when thereof you are robbed, what to be ‘neath’?

Lacan, J., “Homage Done to Marguerite Duras, for the Ravishment of Lol V. Stein,” *The Lacanian Review*, No 13, 2022, p. 23.

I specify that he is mad, not because he loves a woman who is flirtatious and betrays him [...] because he is caught, under Love's banner, by the very feeling that directs this art of mirages at which the beautiful Celimene excels: namely, the narcissism of the idle rich that defines the psychological structure of "high society" ["monde"] in all eras, which is doubled here by the other narcissism that is especially manifest in certain eras in the collective idealization of the feeling of being in love. Celimene, at the mirror's focal point, and her admirers, forming a radiating circumference around her, indulge in the play of these passions [feux]. Alceste does too, no less than the others, for if he does not tolerate its lies, it is simply because his narcissism is more demanding. Of course, he expresses it to himself in the form of the law of the heart:

I'd have them be sincere, and never part

With any word that isn't from the heart.

Yes, but when his heart speaks, it makes some strange exclamations. For example, when Philinte asks him, "You think then that she loves you?," Alceste replies, "Heavens, yes! I wouldn't love her did I not think so."

I suspect that Clérambault would have recognized this reply as having more to do with a delusion of passion than with love. And no matter how widespread the fantasy may be in such passions of the test of the loved object's fall from grace, I find that it has an odd accent in Alceste's case:

I love you more than can be said or thought;

Indeed, I wish you were in such distress

That I might show to all my devotedness.

Yes, I could wish that you were wretchedly poor,

Unloved, uncherished, utterly obscure;

That fate had set you down upon the earth

Without possessions, rank, or gentle birth . . .

[. . .]

As for the mainspring of his twists and turns, it lies in a mechanism that I would relate not to the self-punishment but rather to the suicidal aggression of narcissism, [. . .]"

Lacan, J., “Presentation on Psychical Causality”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York, Norton, 2006, pp. 141-143.

This mythology of instinctual maturation, built out of bits and pieces selected from Freud's work, actually engenders intellectual problems whose vapor, condensing into nebulous ideals, in return irrigates the original myth with its showers. The best writers spill their ink positing equations that satisfy the requirements of that mysterious "genital love" (there are notions whose strangeness is better placed in the parenthesis of a borrowed term, and they initial their attempt with an admission of anon liquei). No one, however, appears to be shaken up by the

malaise this results in; and people see it, rather, as a reason to encourage all the Munchhausens of psychoanalytic normalization to raise themselves up by the hair on their head in the hope of attaining the paradise of full realization of the genital object, indeed of the object itself.

Lacan, J., “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York, Norton, 2006, p. 218.

The object, as I have shown in Freudian experience—the object of desire, where we see it in its nakedness—is but the slag of a fantasy in which the subject does not come to after blacking out [*syncope*]. It is a case of necrophilia.

Lacan, J., “Kant with Sade”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 658.

Unpredictable quanta by which the love/hate atom glistens in the vicinity of the Thing from which man emerges through a cry, what is experienced, beyond certain limits, has nothing to do with what desire is propped up by in fantasy, which is in fact constituted on the basis of these limits.

***Ibid.*, p. 664.**

Psychoanalysts themselves, when they derive paranoia from homosexuality, describe this homosexuality itself only in desperate negation of itself, which supposedly grounds the conviction of being persecuted and turns the loved one into a persecutor.

Lacan, J., “Motives of Paranoiac Crimes: The Crime of the Papin Sisters”, *The Lacanian Review*, No 10, 2020, p. 27.

[Freud] effectively shows us that when, during the now-recognized first stages of infantile sexuality, the forced reduction of primitive hostility between brothers comes into operation, an abnormal inversion of this hostility into desire may be produced, and that this mechanism engenders a special type of homosexual [. . .] It is a painful integration, in which the first sacrificial demands that society will never ceased to make of its members are marked: this is its link with this personal intentionality to inflict suffering which constitutes sadism.

***Ibid.*, p. 29.**

The “malady of being two” that the two patients suffer from scarcely frees them from the malady of Narcissus. A moral passion that ends by one taking one’s life.

***Ibid.*, p. 31.**

The pre-genital libido is the sensitive spot, the moment of mirage between Eros and Thanatos, between love and hate. That is the simplest way to render comprehensible the crucial role played by the so-called desexualized libido of the ego in the possibility of reversion, of instantaneous swerving of hate into love, of love into hate.

Lacan, J., *Freud's Papers on Technique: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. Forrester (New York: Norton, 1988): p. 180.

If love aspires to the unfolding of the being of the other, hate wishes the opposite, namely its abasement, its deranging, its deviation, its delirium, its detailed denial, its subversion. That is what makes hate a career with no limit, just as love is.

***Ibid.*, p. 277.**

Love, now no longer conceived of as a passion but as an active gift, is always directed, beyond imaginary captivation, towards the being of the loved subject, towards his particularity. That is why it can accept to such a great extent his weaknesses and detours, why it can even admit to his errors, but there is a point at which it comes to a halt, a point which is only located in relation to being—when the loved being goes too far in his betrayal of himself and persists in self-deception, love can follow no longer.

***Ibid.*, p. 276.**

Now learn to distinguish love as an imaginary passion from the active gift which it constitutes on the symbolic plane. Love, the love of the person who desires to be loved, is essentially an attempt to capture the other in oneself, in oneself as object.

***Ibid.*, p. 276.**

The desire to be loved is the desire that the loving object should be taken as such, caught up, enslaved to the absolute particularity of oneself as object. The person who aspires to be loved is not at all satisfied, as is well known, with being loved for his attributes. He demands to be loved as far as the complete subversion of the subject into a particularity can go, and into whatever may be most opaque, most unthinkable in his particularity. One wants to be loved for everything—not only for one's ego, as Descartes says, but for the colour of one's hair, for one's idiosyncrasies, for one's weaknesses, for everything.

***Ibid.*, p. 276.**

Where does the difference between someone who is psychotic and someone who isn't, come from? It comes from the fact that for the psychotic a love relation that abolishes him as subject is possible insofar as it allows a radical heterogeneity of the Other. But this love is also a dead love.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London Norton, 1993, p 253.

The psychotic can only apprehend the Other in the relation with the signifier, he lingers over a mere shell, an envelope, a shadow, the form of speech. The psychotic's Eros is located where speech is absent. It is there that he finds supreme love.

***Ibid.*, p. 254.**

The supervalence that the object assumes (...) is grounded on the fact that a real object assumes its function as a part of the love object. The drive aims at the real object as a part of the symbolic object. It is on this basis that any understanding of oral absorption, of the mechanism of so-called regressive oral absorption that can intervene in any love relation, becomes possible.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The Object Relation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, 2020, p 167.

Love - I am saying that this is the point at which the highpoint of Classical comedy is located. Love is here. It is curious to see to what extent we no longer perceive love except through all kinds of partitions, romantic partitions, that stifle it, whereas the mainspring of love is essentially comical.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 125.

If a homosexual turns out to have identified with her (the mother), it isn't at all insofar as she has or doesn't have the object, purely and simply, but insofar as she holds the key to the particular situation that prevails at the exit of the Oedipus complex, where judgment is passed as to which of the two ultimately holds the power. Not just any power, but very precisely the power of love.

***Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.**

(. . .) his ego (Gide's ego), undeniably, doesn't stop identifying - and forever, and without knowing it - with the subject of the desire upon which he is now dependent. He falls in love forever, for the rest of his existence - this little boy that for an instant had been in the arms of his aunt, this aunt who stroked his neck, his shoulders and his chest. His entire life is there.

***Ibid.*, p. 243.**

In other words, what has been subtracted at the level of what becomes his ego-ideal (Gide's ego-ideal), namely the desire of which he is the object and which he is unable to bear, he adopts for himself, he falls in love forever and for all eternity with this same caressed little boy he had no wish to be.

***Ibid.*, p. 244.**

The same act (of beating a child) which, when it applies to the other, is taken to be abusive and perceived by the subject as the sign that the other is not loved, assumes an essential value when it's the subject who becomes its support. This is only conceivable, properly speaking, via the function of signifiers. It is in as much as this act raises the subject himself to the dignity of a signifier-subject that at this moment he is brought into its positive inaugural register. It institutes him as a subject with whom there can be a question of love.

***Ibid.*, p. 325.**

Freud thus brings us from the initial point to the very heart of being, where the most intense degree of love and hate is situated. In effect, the other child is represented here as being subjected, by the father's violence and whim [*caprice*], to a maximal fall from grace [*déchéance*] or symbolic devaluing, as being absolutely frustrated and deprived of love. Hatred targets him in his very being, targeting in him what is demanded beyond all demand - namely, love.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and Its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 122.

In this fantasy [men's fantasy of woman's masochism], it is by proxy and in relation to the masochistic structure that is imagined in woman that man sustains his jouissance through something that is his own anxiety. This is what the object covers over. In men, the object is the condition of desire. Jouissance depends on this question. Now, desire is merely covering over anxiety. You can see the margin he still has to cover to be in range of jouissance.

***Ibid.*, p. 190.**

Don Juan is a man who would lack nothing. This is perfectly tangible in the term I'm going to have to come back to in connection with the general structure of masochism. This almost sounds like some jape, but Don Juan's relation to the image of the father qua un-castrated is a pure feminine image.

***Ibid.*, p. 192.**

A man can truly love a woman with all the affection and devotion we can imagine, but the fact remains that if he desires another woman - even if the first woman knows that what he desires in this other woman is her shoe, the hem of her dress, or the makeup she wears on her face - his homage to being thus goes to the other woman.

***Ibid.*, p. 450.**

If at the summit of the ethical imperative something ends up being articulated in a way that is as strange or even scandalous for some people as "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," this is because it is the law of the relation of the subject to himself that he make himself his own neighbor, as far as his relationship to his desire is concerned.

Lacan, J., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 76.

It is a register where there is both good and bad will, that *volens nolens*, which is the true meaning of the ambivalence one fails to grasp, when one approaches it on the level of love and hate.

***Ibid.*, p. 104.**

Neither pleasure nor the organizing, unifying, erotic instincts of life suffice in any way to make of the living organism, of the necessities and needs of life, the center of psychic development.

***Ibid.*, p. 104.**

We can found our case on the following, namely, that every time that Freud stops short in horror at the consequences of the commandment to love one's neighbor, we see evoked the presence of that fundamental evil which dwells within this neighbor. But if that is the case, then it also dwells within me. And what is more of a neighbor to me than this heart within which is that of my *jouissance* and which I don't dare go near? For as soon as I go near it, as Civilization and Its Discontents makes clear, there rises up the unfathomable aggressivity from which I flee, that I turn against me, and which in the very place of the vanished Law adds its weight to that which prevents me from crossing a certain frontier at the limit of the Thing.

***Ibid.*, p. 186.**

I retreat from loving my neighbor as myself because there is something on the horizon there that is engaged in some form of intolerable cruelty. In that sense, to love one's neighbor may be the cruelest of choices.

***Ibid.*, p. 194.**

Can't one nevertheless say that Sade teaches us, in the order of symbolic play, how to attempt to go beyond the limit, and how to discover the laws of one's neighbor's space as such? The space in question is that which is formed when we have to do not with this fellow self whom we so easily turn into our reflection, and whom we necessarily implicate in the same misrecognitions that characterize our own self, but this neighbor who is closest to us, the neighbor whom we sometimes take in our arms, if only to make love to. I am not speaking here of ideal love, but of the act of making love.

***Ibid.*, p. 197.**

To love him, to love him as myself, is necessarily to move toward some cruelty. His or mine?, you will object. But haven't I just explained to you that nothing indicates they are

distinct? It seems rather that they are the same, on condition that those limits which oblige me to posit myself opposite the other as my fellow man are crossed.

***Ibid.*, p. 198.**

But which of them is the most authentically deceived, if not he who follows closely, and without allowing himself to drift, what is traced out for him by a love that I will call horrible?

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity Press, 2015, p. 163.

Even if guilt is not always and immediately involved in the triggering of love, in the flash of falling in love or love at first sight, it is no less clear that, even in relationships that begin under such poetic auspices, in time it tends to happen that all the effects of active censure come to revolve around the beloved object. [. . .] it is to that person that we come to ask for permission.

***Ibid.*, p. 338.**

Note that it is easier to get oneself loved by one's ego-ideal than by the object on whom the ego-ideal was at one point modeled (. . .) The ego-ideal can itself become something equivalent to what in love can provide the full satisfaction of wanting to be loved, of *geliebt werden wollen*.

***Ibid.*, pp. 349-350.**

We remain stuck (...) at the level (...) of the notion of jealous hatred, the hatred that springs forth from "jalouissance," the hatred that "sprimages forth (*s'imageaillisse*) from the gaze of the little guy observed by Saint Augustine.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London Norton, 1999, pp. 99-100.

People ponder an eternal love, and it even happens that people speak about it indiscriminately, without knowing in the slightest what they are saying, because by that they mean the other life, if I may so express it. You can see how all this gets under way, and where this idea of eternity leads us. No one knows what it is.

Lacan, J. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 128.

MILLER

I can't love myself as the Thing. Can I love the other in what makes up his jouissance, and precisely, in what is evil in it? When it comes to loving the other, jouissance is a problem.

Miller, J.-A., "The Love of One's Neighbor: Saint Martin and Solomon", *The Lacanian Review*, No 15, Paris, NLS, 2024, p. 47.

The imaginary One released, assumed, created by love, makes you, its correlate. This is what justifies attributing a narcissistic status to love. The One of love is quite distinct from the One of existence—which is an effect of writing, not of signification.

Miller, J.-A., "The One is Letter", trans. A. Duncan, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 37/38, Autumn/ Winter 2021, p. 40.

A closely entwined couple is one where the twain are as one. Freud saw the One that absorbs the dyad as being the very principle of Eros, like Saint Paul: "... they two shall be one flesh". This does not stop the One from being the result of a miscalculation, along the lines of $1+1=1$. People think that to be joined at the hip is the ideal sexual relationship, but it is imaginary. [...] the paradise of lovers in their own world, encapsulated in the sphere of the One, often veers off into them walling themselves up in their mutual hate.

Miller, J.-A., "Omnia Vincit Amor", *Hurly-Burly*, No 6, September 2011, p. 211.

One can make love without speech, and this aspect is in line with the fetish object.

Miller, J.-A., "Of Distribution Between the sexes", *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 11, 2003, p. 24.

LAURENT

Beyond all the psychological characteristics of the one who is targeted by love and hatred, passions are addressed to a point beyond. From his first seminar he made love and hatred passions of being.

Laurent, E., "Europe Through the Ordeal of Hate (Part II)", *The Lacanian Review*, No 9, 2020, p. 258.

Hatred takes precedence over love for approaching the Other. Love is attached to semblance, whereas hateful passion aims at the real . . .

***Ibid.*, p. 258.**

This primacy of hatred is above all a de-idealization of love as the primary affect.

***Ibid.*, p. 259.**

This *hainamoration* is the consequence of separation from the jouissance of other Ones. Knowing this, knowing the aporias of love and of jouissance of the vicinity of the neighbor, does not condemn us to cynicism, nor to immobility, nor to simple observation of the irreducible presence of hatred or evil.

***Ibid.*, p. 259.**

LOVE PREVENTED



Caravaggio, *I bari*

FREUD

We may suspect, of course, that, if so, our case of illness might end up as a 'commonplace' love-story. But the healing power of love against a delusion is not to be despised – and was not our hero's infatuation for his Grdiva sculpture a complete instance of being in love, though of being in love with something past and lifeless?

Freud, S., "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva* (1907 [1906])", *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume IX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1959, p. 22.

Idealization is a process that concerns the *object*; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. For example, the sexual overvaluation of an object is an idealization of it. In so far as sublimation describes something that has to do with the instinct and idealization something to do with the object, the two concepts are to be distinguished from each other.

Freud, S., "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 94.

It is universally known, and we take it as a matter of course, that a person who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the things of the external world, in so

far as they do not concern his suffering. Closer observation teaches us that he also withdraws libidinal interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he ceases to love.

***Ibid.*, p. 82.**

A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love.

***Ibid.*, p. 85.**

Let us consider again the outstanding fact that the patient protected herself against her love for a man by means of a paranoid delusion. [...] The key to the understanding of this is to be found in the history of the development of the delusion. As we might have expected, the later was at first aimed against the woman. But now, *on this paranoid basis, the advance from a female to a male object was accomplished.*

Freud, S., "A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease" (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XIV, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 271.

For instance, the so-called neurasthenic's unconscious attachment to incestuous love-objects prevents him from choosing a strange woman as his object and restricts his sexual activity to phantasy. But within the limits of phantasy, he achieves the progress which is denied (from) him and he succeeded in replacing mother and sister by extraneous objects. Since the veto of the censorship does not come into action with these objects, he can become conscious in his phantasies of his choice of these substitute-figures.

***Ibid.*, p. 271.**

A love that does not discriminate seems to me to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its object; and secondly, not all men are worthy of love.

Freud, S., "Civilization and its Discontents" (1930), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XXI, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 102.

Indeed, if this grandiose commandment had run 'Love thy neighbour as thy neighbour loves thee', I should not take exception to it. And there is a second commandment, which seems to me even more incomprehensible and arouses still stronger opposition in me. It is 'Love thine enemies.' If I think it over, however, I see that I am wrong in treating it as a greater imposition. At bottom it is the same thing.

***Ibid.*, p. 110.**

When she did appear at last, he was quite blissful and never took his eyes off the flat opposite. The violence with which this "long-range love" came over him is to be explained by his having no playmates of either sex. (. . .)

Freud, S., "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" (1909), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume X, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 16.

Whereas he treats the little girls at home aggressively, in this other affair he appears in the part of a platonic and languishing admirer. Perhaps this has to do with the little girls at home being village children, while the other is a young lady of refinement. As I have already mentioned, he once said he would like to sleep with her.

***Ibid.*, p. 18.**

A world-catastrophe of this kind is not infrequent during the agitated stage in other cases of paranoia. (Footnote: An 'end of the world' based upon other motives is to be found at the climax of the ecstasy of love (cf. Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*); in this case it is not the ego but the single love-object which absorbs all the cathexes directed upon the external world.

Freud, S., "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia" (1911), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 69.

As for the demi-mondaine who had roused her most recent and by far her strongest emotions, she had always been treated coldly by her and never been allowed any greater favor than to kiss her hand, she was probably making a virtue of necessity when she kept insisting on the purity of her love and her physical repulsion against the idea of any sexual intercourse.

Freud, S., "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 153.

What is certainly of greater importance is that in her behavior towards her love-object she had throughout assumed the masculine part: that is to say, she displayed the humility and the sublime overvaluation of the sexual object so characteristic of the male lover, the renunciation of all narcissistic satisfaction, and the preference for being the lover rather than the beloved. She had thus not only chosen a feminine love-object but had also developed a masculine attitude towards that object.

***Ibid.*, p. 154.**

Her humility and her tender lack of pretensions, (...) her bliss when she was allowed to accompany the lady a little way and to kiss her hand on parting, her joy when she heard her praised as beautiful (while any recognition of her own beauty by another person meant nothing at all to her), her pilgrimages to places once visited by the loved one, the silence of all more sensual wishes—all these little traits in her resembled the first passionate adoration of a youth for a celebrated actress whom he regards as far above him, to whom he scarcely dares lift his bashful eyes. The correspondence with 'a special type of choice of object made by men (...) whose special features I traced to attachment to the mother, held good even to the smallest details.

***Ibid.*, p. 160.**

LACAN

Gide as a child, between death and masturbatory eroticism, receives, as far as love is concerned, only the kind of speech that protects and the kind that prohibits; in taking his father, death took away the speech that humanizes desire. This is why desire is limited to the clandestine for him. As he tells us, one evening was for him his rendezvous with fate, the illumination of his night, and his engagement in vows—vows in the name of which he was to make his cousin Madeleine Rondeaux his wife and which initiated for him what he maintained right up until the end to have been his only love.

How can we conceptualize what happened in that instant which "determined the course of his life" and that he cannot "recall without anguish," as he says in *La Porte étroite*? What is this

state of being "drunk with love, with pity, with an indistinguishable mixture of enthusiasm, self-abnegation, and virtue," where he calls upon God to "offer [himself] up to Him, unable to conceive that existence could have any other object than to shelter this child from fear, from evil, from life.

Lacan, J., "The Youth of Gide", *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 634.

To convince ourselves that this love, "embalmed so as not to suffer the ravages of time"—about which Gide says, "No one can imagine the love of an Uranist"—is truly love, why limit ourselves to his testimony? Because it is not consistent with the "Dear Abby"-like understanding of love on which psychoanalysts, with their chimerical belief in oblativ/genital relations, insist?

As Delay rightly emphasizes, everything here is supported by a very old tradition, justifying his mention of the mystical bonds of courtly love. Gide himself was not afraid to relate his union, despite its bourgeois trappings, to Dante's mystical union with Beatrice. And if psychoanalysts were capable of understanding what their master said about the death instinct, they would be able to recognize that self-realization can become bound up with the wish to end one's life.

***Ibid.*, p. 635.**

If courtly love, more than any other form of love, prides itself on being the love that gives what it does not have, this is certainly what the female homosexual excels in doing regarding what she is missing. It is not really the incestuous object that she chooses at the expense of her own sex; what she does not accept is that this object only assumes [*assume*] his sex at the cost of castration. This is not to say that she renounces hers for all that: on the contrary, in all the forms of female homosexuality, even unconscious, the supreme interest is in femininity and Jones clearly detected the link here between the fantasy of man, the invisible witness, and the care taken by the subject in giving her partner jouissance.

Lacan, J., "Guiding Remarks for a Convention on Female Sexuality", *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 619.

Freud, falling into the same trap, tells us that Eros is a tendency towards the One. And that's precisely the whole question – that the real is actually two, and from that it's perfectly clear that the real, as I put it, is precisely the impossible. Namely, the impossibility of that which would give a meaning to the relation called sexual.

Lacan, J., "The Lacanian Phenomenon", *The Lacanian Review*, No 9, 2020, p. 31.

To counter Kant's apologue, courtly love offers us a no less tempting path, but it requires us to be erudite. To be erudite by one's position is to bring on the attack of the erudites, and in this field that is tantamount to the entrance of the clowns.

Lacan, J., "Kant with Sade", *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 661.

Let us say that a religious man leaves responsibility for the cause to God [. . .] His demand is subordinated to his presumed desire for a God who must then be seduced. The game of love starts in this way.

Lacan, J., "Science and Truth", *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 741.

It is striking that this meaning reduces to non-sense: the non-sense of the sexual relation, something that love stones have, throughout time, made obvious.

Lacan, J., *Television*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 8.

Isn't it because of his sister-in-law that de Sade, whom, as we all know, Oedipal prohibition had separated from his wife—as the theoreticians of courtly love have always said, there is no love in marriage--loved truth so much?

***Ibid.*, p. 68.**

Think about, sociologically, the forms of enamoration, of falling in love, attested in culture. [. . .] In certain cultures things have become so worn out that it's extremely awkward to know how to give form to love (. . .) Let's take as a reference point the technique [. . .] or the art of love – say, the practices of the love relation that prevailed for a time down in our Provence or in our Languedoc. There is an entire tradition there [. . .] in which one can observe a degradation in love patterns, which became increasingly uncertain.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London Norton, 1993, p. 254.

Undoubtedly, over the course of this historical evolution passionate love becomes, to the extent that it's practiced in the style called platonic or passionate idealism, an increasingly ridiculous thing, or what is commonly called, quite rightly, a form of madness. [. . .] The thing, if it no longer takes place with a beautiful woman or with a lady, is accomplished in a darkened cinema with an image on the screen.

***Ibid.*, p. 254.**

This dimension tends in the direction of the madness of pure mirage insofar as the original style of the love relation has been lost. It strikes us as comical, this total sacrifice of one being for another, systematically pursued by people who had the time to do nothing but this. [...] We analysts would find plenty to interest us in this mixture of sensuality and chastity that was technically sustained [...] provides us with an analogy with what takes place in the psychotic [...] the psychotic loves his delusion likes himself.

***Ibid.*, p. 254.**

[courtly love] implies a very rigorous technical elaboration of the approach of love that entailed a long practice of restraint in the presence of the loved object, aiming to make a reality of what lies beyond, which is what is sought in love and is specifically erotic.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The Object Relation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, 2020, pp. 79.

She will ultimately be led to the passion, which is literally qualified as a *consuming passion*, for the person who in the text is called *the lady*, [...] without any requirement, without desire, without even hope of return, with this character of a gift, the lover projecting even beyond any kind of show from the beloved. In short, we find here one of the most highly cultivated forms of love relation.

***Ibid.*, p. 114.**

These subjects (who have not abandoned their incestuous object) are incapable of contemplating being with a woman who for them has the full status of being lovable and human, of being in the sense of complete, of a being who, as the saying goes, is able to give

and give herself. There is an object there, we are told, which of course means that it's there under a mask, for it isn't the mother that the subject addresses, but the woman who succeeds her and takes her place. Here, then, there is no desire. On the other hand, Freud tells us, these subjects get their pleasure from prostitutes.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 308.

Sexual desire presents itself in a problematic manner from the perspective of the demand for love, whatever one says, whatever holy water one tries to cover it with in the name of 'oblation'.

***Ibid.*, p. 362.**

This place (in which desire is located) is always beyond demand inasmuch as demand aims for the satisfaction of need, and it lies on this side of demand inasmuch as the latter, by virtue of being articulated in symbolic terms, goes beyond all the satisfactions to which it appeals, inasmuch as it's a demand for love, which targets the being of the Other and aims to obtain from the Other this essential presentification, inasmuch as the Other gives his very being, which lies beyond all possible satisfaction and is precisely what is aimed at in love.

***Ibid.*, p. 384.**

I mean that, if instead of speaking about 'libido' or the 'genital object,' we speak about 'genital desire,' it may seem harder to take for granted that the development of this desire automatically implies the possibility of opening oneself up to love, or the possibility of a total actualization of love.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and Its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 4.

Freud argued that, whereas desire seems in fact to bring with it a certain quantum of love, it is very often a love that leads to conflict within oneself, a love that is not owned, a love that refuses to be owned.

***Ibid.*, p. 5.**

For in the end, it is obvious that in real life, love and desire are two different things. We should speak clearly and say that we can love someone a great deal and desire someone else.

***Ibid.*, p. 450.**

...what Freud would call *Überschätzung* or overvaluation of the object - and that I will henceforth call object sublimation - under conditions in which the object of a loving passion takes on a certain significance..., under certain conditions of sublimation of the feminine object or, in other words, the exaltation we call love - a form of exaltation that is historically specific, and to which Freud gives us the clue,...in which he says that in the modern period the emphasis of the libido is on the object rather than on the instinct.

Lacan, J., *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 109.

Well now, it is precisely that kind of consensus we see born at a certain historical moment around the ideal of courtly love. For a certain highly restricted circle, that ideal is to be found at the origin of a moral code, including a whole series of modes of behaviour, of loyalties, measures, services, and exemplary forms of conduct. And if that interests us so directly, it is because its central point was an erotics.

Ibid., p. 145.

At the high point, which stretches from the beginning of the eleventh century to the first third of the thirteenth, the very special technique of these courtly love poets played a highly important role. It is difficult for us today to evaluate precisely the importance of that role, but certain circles - in the courtly love sense, court circles, aristocratic circles - that occupied an elevated position in society were certainly influenced markedly.

Ibid., p. 145.

The question as to whether there were, in fact, formal lessons in love has been raised. The way in which Michel de Nostre-Dame, otherwise known as Nostradamus, represents at the beginning of the fifteenth century the way in which juridical power was exercised by the Ladies - whose extravagant Languedocian names he cites - cannot fail to excite a thrill in us at its strangeness.

Ibid., p. 145-6.

This is something that was faithfully reproduced by Stendhal in "On Love," an admirable work on the subject, and one that is very close to the interest displayed by the romantics in the resurgence of the poetry of courtly love, which was called Provençal at the time, but which was, properly speaking, from the region of Toulouse or indeed from the Limousin.

Ibid., p. 146.

As one of those put it who at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany formulated its characteristics, the point of departure of courtly love is its quality as a scholastics of unhappy love. Certain terms define the register according to which the Lady's values are attained - a register indicated by the norms which regulate the exchanges between the partners of the strange rite, namely, reward, clemency, grace or Gnade, felicity.

Ibid., p. 146.

With courtly love things are all the more surprising because they emerge at a time when the historical circumstances are such that nothing seems to point to what might be called the advancement of women or indeed their emancipation.

Ibid., p. 147.

The object involved, the feminine object, is introduced oddly enough through the door of privation or of inaccessibility. Whatever the social position of him who functions in the role, the inaccessibility of the object is posited as a point of departure. [...] It is impossible to serenade one's Lady in her poetic role in the absence of the given that she is surrounded and isolated by a barrier.

Ibid., p. 149.

The poetry of courtly love, in effect, tends to locate in the place of the Thing certain discontents of the culture. And it does so at a time when the historical circumstances bear witness to a disparity between the especially harsh conditions of reality and certain fundamental demands. By means of a form of sublimation specific to art, poetic creation consists in positing an object I can only describe as terrifying, an inhuman partner.

Ibid., p. 150.

Now from the point of view of the pleasure principle, the paradox of what might be called the effect of Vorlust, of foreplay, is precisely that it persists in opposition to the purposes of the

pleasure principle. It is only insofar as the pleasure of desiring, or, more precisely, the pleasure of experiencing unpleasure, is sustained that we can speak of the sexual valorization of the preliminary stages of the act of love.

***Ibid.*, p. 152.**

One also reads *Militiae species amor est*, "Love is a kind of military service"

***Ibid.*, p. 153.**

To evoke *pelage de galenen* [a flat sea] concerning love makes it quite clear that a bit of fun is being had here. Love is what makes you break down, it's what leads to a fiasco.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity Press, 2015, p. 106.

She [the young homosexual woman] behaves like the knight who suffers everything for his Lady, who contents himself with the most lifeless and least substantial favors, who even prefers to have these and nothing more. The more the object of his love moves in the opposite direction to what might be termed reward, the more he overestimates this object of eminent dignity.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 109.

How is it that *a*, the object of identification, is also *a*, the object of love? Well, it is to the extent that it metaphorically wrenches the lover, to use the medieval and traditional term, from the status in which he presents himself, the status of the loveable one, *έρώμενος*, to make him *έρών*, a subject of lack, whereby he constitutes himself properly in love. This is what gives him, so to speak, the instrument of love inasmuch as - we fall back into this - one loves, when one is a lover, with what one hasn't got.

***Ibid.*, p. 117.**

This is what allows her, having failed in the realization of her desire, to realize it both differently and in the same way, as *έρών*. She turns herself into a lover. In other words, she poises herself in what she hasn't got, the phallus, and to make a good show of having it, she gives it. It is indeed an utterly demonstrative way. Freud tells us that she behaves towards the Lady as a devoted knight, as a man, as one who can sacrifice for her what he has, his phallus.

***Ibid.*, p. 123.**

The question will be thoroughly clarified if we take it from the angle I'm speaking about, namely, the function of desire in love. You're ready to hear this, which moreover is a truth that's always been well known, but which has never been given its rightful place—inasmuch as desire enters the fray of love and is one of its major stakes, desire doesn't pertain to the loved object.

***Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.**

Now, when courtly love appears outside the field of strictly cultural and ritualistic references, where clearly it is addressed to something other than the Lady, it is on the contrary the sign of some shortcoming, some shirking, faced with the difficult paths that gaining access to a true love implies.

***Ibid.*, p. 334.**

If I took the trouble to dwell at some length on courtly love in my Seminar on ethics, it is because it allowed me to assert that sublimation concerns women in love relationships, at the cost of constituting them qua Thing.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVI: From an Other to the other*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity Press, 2024, p. 199.

In the institution known as courtly love, the woman does not love, at least in theory, for no one knows anything about it. Can you imagine what a relief that would be? Yet it sometimes happens, nevertheless, in novels, that the woman gets swept away. We see what happens afterward.

***Ibid.*, p. 209.**

[courtly love] it is rooted in the discourse of loyalty (*fealite*), of fidelity to the person. In the final analysis, the person has to do with the master's discourse. Courtly love is, for man – in relation to whom the lady is entirely, and in the most servile sense of the world, a subject – the only way to elegantly pull off the absence of the sexual relationship.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London Norton, 1999, p. 69.

In the Seminar *Encore*, I took a stand against this Φ being a placeholder for the signifier that I have only been able to sustain by means of a complicated letter of mathematical notation, namely $S(A/)$. S of barred A is something altogether different from Φ . It is not that with which man makes love. In the end, he makes love with his unconscious, and nothing more. As for what the woman fantasizes, if this is really what the film presents us with, it is something that, either way, impedes the encounter.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price Cambridge: Polity, 2018, pp. 107-108.

LOVE AND DISCOURSE



Caravaggio, Riposo durante la fuga in Egitto

FREUD

Moreover, that a person will correspond with an absent friend whom he cannot talk to is scarcely less obvious than that if he has lost his voice he will try to make himself understood in writing. Dora's aphonia, then, allowed of the following symbolic interpretation. When the man she loved was away she gave up speaking; speech had lost its value since she could not speak to him. On the other hand, writing gained in importance, as being the only means of communication with him in his absence.

Freud, S., “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 40.

The communal life of human beings had, therefore, a two-fold foundation: the compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity, and the power of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object—the woman—, and made the woman unwilling to be deprived of the part of herself which had been separated off from her—her child. Eros and Ananke [Love and Necessity] have become the parents of human civilization too.

Freud, S., “Civilization and its Discontents” (1930), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 101.

The evidence of psychoanalysis shows that almost every intimate emotional relation between two people which last for some time – marriage, friendship [...] – contains a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which only escapes perception as a result of repression.

Freud, S., “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 101.

Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. [...]

Identification, in fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone's removal. It behaves like a derivative of the first, *oral* phase of the organisation of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such.

***Ibid.*, p. 105.**

First, identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may arise with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct.

***Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.**

Things take a sudden turn [in male homosexuality]: the young man does not abandon his mother, but identifies with her; he transforms himself into her, and now looks about for objects which can replace his ego for him, and on which he can bestow such love and care as he has experienced from his mother. [...] It [the identification] remoulds the ego in one of its important features – in its sexual character – upon the model of what has hitherto been the object. In this process the object itself is renounced.

***Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.**

In one class of cases of being in love is nothing more than object-cathexis on the part of the sexual instincts with a view to directly sexual satisfaction, a cathexis which expires, moreover, when this aim has been reached; [...] It was possible to calculate with certainty upon the revival of the need which had just expired; and this must no doubt have been the first motive for directing a lasting cathexis upon the sexual object and for 'loving' it in the passionless intervals as well.

***Ibid.*, p. 111.**

A man will show a sentimental enthusiasm for women whom he deeply respects but who do not excite him to sexual activities; and he will only be potent with other women whom he does not 'love' and thinks little of or even despises.

***Ibid.*, p. 112.**

The tendency which falsifies judgement in this respect is that of *idealisation*. [...] We see that the object is being treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object. It is even obvious, in many forms of love-choice, that the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own. We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism.

***Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.**

The ego becomes more and more unassuming and modest, and the object more and more sublime and precious, until at last it gets possession of the entire self-love of the ego, whose self-sacrifice thus follows as a natural consequence. The object has so to speak consumed the ego. Traits of humility, of the limitation of narcissism, and of self-injury occur in every case of being in love; [...] This happens especially easily with love that is unhappy and cannot be satisfied: for in spite of everything each sexual satisfaction always involves a reduction in

sexual overvaluation. [...] In the blindness of love remorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime.

***Ibid.*, p. 113.**

LACAN

Now, the analyst undoubtedly knows, on the other hand, that he must not respond to appeals that the subject makes to him in this place, as implicit as they may be; otherwise he will see transference love arise there that nothing, except its artificial production, distinguishes from passionate love, the conditions which produced it thus failing due to their effect, analytic discourse being reduced to the silence of the evoked presence. The analyst also knows that the more he fails to respond, the more he provokes in the subject the aggression, and even hatred, characteristic of negative transference.

Lacan, J., “Variations on the Standard Treatment”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London, Norton, 2006, p. 287.

To confine ourselves to a more lucid tradition, perhaps we can understand the celebrated maxim by La Rochefoucauld—“There are people who would never have fallen in love but for hearing love discussed”—not in the romantic sense of a thoroughly imaginary “realization” of love that would make this remark into a bitter objection, but as an authentic recognition of what love owes to the symbol and of what speech brings with it by way of love.

Lacan, J., “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London, Norton, 2006, p. 219.

Who, if not us, will call back into question the objective status of this ‘I,’ which a historical evolution particular to our culture tends to confuse with the subject? The specific impact of this anomaly on every level of language deserves to be displayed, and first and foremost as regards the first person as grammatical subject in our languages [*langues*—the “I love” that hypostasizes a tendency in a subject who denies it.

Lacan, J., “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London, Norton, 2006, p. 96.

Theoreticians in the Middle Ages showed a rather different kind of penetration when they debated whether love could be understood in terms of a ‘physical’ theory or an ‘ecstatic’ theory, both of which involved the reabsorption of man’s ego, the one by its reintegration into a universal good, the other by the subject’s effusion toward an object devoid of alterity.

***Ibid.*, p. 97.**

Now this analytic discourse implies a promise: to promote a novelty. And that, awesomely enough, into the field from which the unconscious is produced, since its finesses [*impasses*] — among other situations to be sure, but it is still the main one — come into play in the game of love.

Lacan, J., *Television*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 28.

[...] it is actually sexology that you can't expect anything from. There is no way, on the basis of observing just what crosses our senses, namely perversion, that anything new in love will ever be constructed.

***Ibid.*, p. 31.**

For after all friendship, or rather Aristotle's *φιλία* [...], is really the point where this spectacle of love shifts into the conjugation of the verb to love, including all that it implies in the economic term husbandry, that is, the law of the dwelling.

***Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.**

Thus it follows that in love it is not the meaning that counts, but rather the sign, as in everything else. In fact, therein lies the whole catastrophe.

***Ibid.*, p. 41.**

The privilege of a desire that lays siege to the subject cannot become obsolete unless this particular turn in the labyrinth, where the fire of an encounter has etched his coat of arms, has been taken a hundred times.

Of course the cipher of this encounter is not simply a print, but a hieroglyph, and may be transferred from one text to others.

But all the metaphors in the world cannot exhaust its meaning, which is not to have any, since it is the mark of the iron with which death brands the flesh when the Word has disentangled flesh from love.

Lacan, J., "The Youth of Gide", *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, pp. 636.

What differentiates the discourse of capitalism is *Verwerfung*, the fact of rejecting, outside all the fields of the symbolic. This brings with it the consequence I have already said it has. What does it reject? Well, castration. Any order, any discourse that aligns itself with capitalism, sweeps to one side what we may simply call, my fine friends, matters of love. You see, it's a mere nothing.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price. Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 91.

To give something of an introduction, to suggest a dimension to some of you, I will say that one cannot *talk of love*, as they say, except in an imbecilic or abject manner. *Abject* is a change for the worse. That's how people speak about it in psychoanalysis. However, that one may write about love is something that ought to be quite striking.

***Ibid.*, p. 108.**

Love is distinct from desire, considered as the limit-relation which is established by every organism with the object which satisfies it. Because its aim is not satisfaction, but being. That is why one can only speak of love where the symbolic relation as such exists.

Lacan, J., *Freud's Papers on Technique: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. Forrester (New York: Norton, 1988): p. 276.

But inversely, and I would say correlatively, as a result of exactly that, to love is to love a being beyond what he or she appears to be. The active gift of love is directed at the other, not in his specificity, but in his being.

***Ibid.*, p. 276.**

I will only remark that love, to the extent that it is one of the three lines of division in which the subject is engaged when he realizes himself symbolically in speech, homes in on the being of the other.

***Ibid.*, p. 276.**

The first form of identification is, then, defined for us as the original tie with an object. It is, to schematize things, the identification with the mother. The other form of identification is the regressive identification with the love object, that is, identification insofar as it should occur somewhere else, at a point on the horizon that is not easy to reach because the demand is precisely unconditional or, more exactly, submitted to the one condition of the existence of signifiers inasmuch as, without the existence of signifiers, there is no possible opening for the dimension of love as such.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 409.

Namely, we must see that demand is never purely and simply a demand for something, since behind every precise demand, every demand for satisfaction, there is, owing to language, the symbolization of the Other, the Other as presence and absence, the Other who may be a subject who provides the gift of love.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and Its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 112.

In a short note in the Three Essays, Freud gives us a kind of brief summary in the style of an essay on the difference that strikes us between the love life of antiquity, of pre-Christians, and our own. It resides, he says, in the fact that in antiquity the emphasis was on the instinct itself, whereas we place it on the object. The Ancients feted the instinct, and, through the intermediary of the instinct, were also ready to honor an object of lesser, common value, whereas we reduce the value of the manifestation of the instinct, and we demand the support of the object on account of the prevailing characteristics of the object.

Lacan, J., *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 98.

To set out to find the instinct again is the result of a certain loss, a cultural loss, of the object. That such a problem exists at the center of that mental crisis from which Freudianism emerged is a question that we will have to ask ourselves. The nostalgia expressed in the idea that the Ancients were closer than we are to the instinct perhaps means no more, like every dream of a Golden Age or El Dorado, than that we are engaged in posing questions at the level of the instinct because we do not yet know what to do as far as the object is concerned. At the level of sublimation the object is inseparable from imaginary and especially cultural elaborations. It is not just that the collectivity recognizes in them useful objects; it finds rather a space of relaxation where it may in a way delude itself on the subject of das Ding, colonize the field of das Ding with imaginary schemes. That is how collective, socially accepted sublimations operate.

***Ibid.*, p. 99.**

Nowhere, not at any moment of the other speeches at the *Symposium*, is love ever taken as seriously or as tragically as it is by Aristophanes. Here we are at the same exact level where we moderns situate love – after courtly love's sublimation (. . .) the romantic confusion concerning this sublimation – namely, the narcissistic overestimation of the subject, of the subject assumed to reside in the beloved object.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity Press, 2015, p. 87.

To stress that love is what is truly unclassifiable, blocking every important situation. Love is what is never in its place and is always inopportune.

***Ibid.*, p. 108.**

The specific Socratic discourse, that of *ἐπιστήμη* (*episteme*), knowledge transparent to itself, cannot be pursued beyond a certain limit concerning a particular object, when this object – assuming that it is the one on which Freud was able to shed new light – is love.

***Ibid.*, p. 117.**

Love, in so far as it is itself a *value*, as the philosophers say very well, is made from the idealization of desire.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 190.

Anxiety is only ever surmounted when the Other has been named. There is only ever any love when there is a name, as everyone knows from experience. The moment the name of he or she to whom we address our love is uttered, we know very well that this is a threshold of the utmost importance.

***Ibid.*, p. 337.**

That there is a love of weakness is no doubt the essence of love. As I have said, love is giving what one doesn't have, namely what might make good [*réparer*] this original weakness.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London Norton, 2007, p. 52.

It is worth noting that I put psychoanalysts on their guard, by connoting this locus they are engaged to through their knowledge as 'love'.

***Ibid.*, p. 184.**

Contrary to what can be read in a famous play by Apollinaire, the same play that introduced the word *surréaliste*, Theresa becomes Tiresias - don't forget that I've just been speaking about blindness - not by letting go, but by retrieving the *two birds of her weakness* - I'm quoting Apollinaire, for those who haven't read it - namely, the large and small balloons that represent them on the theatre stage, and which are perhaps - I'm saying perhaps because I don't want to divert your attention, so I'll make do with a *perhaps* - the very thing owing to which a woman can find *jouissance* only in an absence.

The female homosexual is on no account absent in the *jouissance* that remains to her. I repeat, this puts her at ease with the discourse of love, but it's quite clear that it excludes her from the psychoanalytic discourse, which she can barely stammer through.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2023, p. 9.

What I say of love is assuredly that one cannot speak about it. (...) I spoke of the love letter (*la lettre d'amour*), of the declaration of love – not the same thing as the word of love (*la parole d'amour*).

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London Norton, 1999, p. 12.

Well, I would say now that there is some emergence of psychoanalytic discourse whenever there is a movement from one discourse to another. (...) I am not saying anything else when I say that love is the sign that one is changing discourses.

***Ibid.*, p. 16.**

It is in relation to the para-being that we must articulate what makes up for (*supplie au*) the sexual relationship qua nonexistent. It is clear that, in everything that approaches it, language merely manifests its inadequacy.

What makes up for the sexual relationship is, quite precisely, love.

***Ibid.*, p. 45.**

In love what is aimed at is the subject, the subject as such, insofar as he is presumed in an articulated sentence, in something that is organized or can be organized on the basis of a whole life.

A subject, as such, doesn't have much to do with jouissance. But, on the other hand, his sign is capable of arousing desire. Therein lies the mainspring of love.

***Ibid.*, p. 50.**

MILLER

Socio-cultural stereotypes of womanliness and virility are in the process of radical transformation. [...] Love is becoming "liquid", as noted by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Everyone is being led to invent their own "lifestyle", to assume their mode of jouissance and mode of loving. Traditional scenarios are slowly becoming obsolete.

Miller, J.-A., "We love the One Who Responds to Our Question: 'Who Am I?'", *Hurly-Burly*, No 5, March 2011, p. 179.

No, between any man and any woman, nothing is written in advance, there's no compass, no pre-established relationship. Their encounter isn't programmed like it is between the spermatozoon and the ovum; it's got nothing to do with genes either. Men and women speak, they live in a world of discourse, that's what's decisive.

***Ibid.*, p. 181.**

You are willing to love your neighbour as yourself, but above all when he is at a distance, separated from you. When this Other gets a bit closer, one has to be an optimist like a geneticist to believe that this produces an effect of solidarity, to believe that this leads right away to mutual recognition.

Miller, J.-A., "Extimate Enemies", *The Lacanian Review*, No 3, Spring 2017, p. 39.

The adversary of love is not hate, it is death, Thanatos. It is here that we must differentiate violence and hatred. Hatred is on the same side as love. Hatred, like love, is on the side of Eros. This is why Lacan is justified in speaking about *hainamoration*, a word that really caught on. Both love and hate are modes of affective expression of Eros.

Miller, J.-A., "Violent Children", *The Lacanian Review*, No 5, Winter, 2018, p. 37.

The violence which speaks can be of a hysterical nature as well as of a paranoiac nature. We will say that it is of a hysterical nature when it counts as a demand for love or a complaint about a lack of love. That is to say, when it is placed in the register of Eros. There, in register

of Eros, the violence of the child is the substitute for the satisfaction which did not take place of the demand for love. In such cases, violence is indeed a symptom. And one could say an inverted message.

***Ibid.*, p. 40-41.**

The fiction that substitutes par excellence for what does not exist is love. I was saying that love—and this does not seem silly to me—is an anthropological constant. Someone argued that every man (in the generic sense, the exemplar of humanity) knows that he is mortal and knows when he is in love. Love creates an imaginary One, it isolates a single being—when you miss them, everything is depopulated . . . Love has the property of isolating a One. Obviously, it is an ersatz of the really interesting One, the signifier One, but you are not in love with that one.

Miller, J.-A., “The One is Letter”, trans. A. Duncan, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 37/38, (Autumn/ Winter 2021), p. 39.

Furthermore, this is why in following this thread in his Seminar *Encore* he introduces the love letter, which for us represents the requirement – which comes from the right side of the table – that the object must be an Other who speaks.

Miller, J.-A., “Of Distribution Between the sexes”, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 11, 2003, p. 24.

The father, the laws, even the rules of propriety, thwart love. Everything that embodies law – what is written, contracts, assets – stumbles up against the contingency of the desire that is realised in caprice.

Miller, J.-A., “Theory of Caprice”, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 21, 2010, p. 28.

LAURENT

To say ‘The ethics of psychoanalysis, today’ supposes the decisive contribution made by Jacques-Alain Miller with his formula of partner-symptom which states clearly and in a way utilisable by psychoanalysts that the bond to the Other is not to be sought along the pathways of love but along those of the drive. It supposes that the solution, to tie together the products of modern narcissism and contemporary solitudes, is to consider an ethics which emphasises that *jouissance* is not autoerotic — in which case the bond could not but emerge on the side of sublime love — but in the repetition itself of the failed encounter with *jouissance* the relation to the other as couple is articulated. The solution to the accusation of *jouissance* as autoerotic and the hope of love as solution had been stated before psychoanalysis not only in religions but in the treasury of literature with their commentaries on the forms of love.

Laurent, E., “The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Today”, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 8 (2002), p. 94.

The convergence of love and hatred in the same person is the source of ambivalence conceived as the astonishing transformation of feelings which tie and untie men in their social life.

Laurent, E., “Europe Through the Ordeal of Hate (Part II)”, *The Lacanian Review*, No 9, 2020, p. 259.

To give up conceiving the social bond under the disguised form of love is not the same as being fascinated by the power of hatred. It is to renounce the failure of love in order to rely on desire only.

Ibid., p. 260.

MAN, WOMAN AND LOVE



Caravaggio, *Johannes in disco*

FREUD

Girls often say openly that their love loses value for them if other people know about it. [...] The woman only recovers her susceptibility to tender feelings in an illicit relationship that has to be kept secret, and in which alone she knows for certain that her own will is uninfluenced. **Freud, S., “The Taboo of Virginity“ (1918), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 203.**

The husband is almost always so to speak only a substitute, never the right man; it is another man - in typical cases the father – who has the first claim to a woman’s love, the husband at most takes second place. ***Ibid.*, p. 203.**

There are women who seem to have fallen out with their husbands completely and who all the same can only make vain efforts to free themselves. As often as they try to direct their love towards some other man, the image of the first, although he is no longer loved, intervenes with inhibiting effects. [...] They cannot get away from them, because they have not completed their revenge upon them. ***Ibid.*, p. 208.**

Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of object. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man's love for them. Nor does their need lie in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfills this condition is the one who finds favour with them.

Freud, S., "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 89.

Perhaps the real fact is that the attachment to the mother is bound to perish, precisely because it was the first and was so intense; just as one can often see happen in the first marriages of young women which they have entered into when they were most passionately in love.

Freud, S., "Female Sexuality" (1931), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 234.

We see, then, that the phase of exclusive attachment to the mother, which may be called the pre-Oedipus phase, possesses a far greater importance in women than it can have in men. Many phenomena of female sexual life which were not properly understood before can be fully explained by reference to this phase. Long ago, for instance, we noticed that many women who have chosen their husband on the model of their father, or have put him in their father's place, nevertheless repeat towards him, in their married life, their bad relations with their mother.

***Ibid.*, p. 230.**

It would be a solution of ideal simplicity if we could suppose that from a particular age onwards the elementary influence of the mutual attraction between the sexes makes itself felt and impels the small woman towards men, while the same law allows the boy to continue with his mother.

Freud, S., "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: Lecture XXXIII, Femininity" (1933), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 119.

One gets an impression that a man's love and a woman's are a phase apart psychologically.

***Ibid.*, p. 131.**

"[...], we attribute a larger amount of narcissism to femininity, which also affects woman's choice of object, so that to be loved is a stronger need for them than to be loved."

Ibid.

LACAN

Demand already constitutes the Other as having the "privilege" of satisfying needs, that is, the power to deprive them of what alone can satisfy them. The Other's privilege here thus outlines the radical form of the gift of what the Other does not have—namely, what is known as its love.

Lacan, J., “The Signification of the Phallus”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 580.

If, indeed, man is able to satisfy his demand for love in his relationship with a woman, inasmuch as the phallic signifier clearly constitutes her as giving in love what she does not have, conversely, his own desire for the phallus will make its signifier emerge in its residual divergence toward "another woman" who may signify this phallus in various ways, either as a virgin or as a prostitute.

***Ibid.*, p. 583.**

If the sexes have different positions with respect to the object, it is owing to the distance that separates the fetishistic form of love from the erotomaniacal form of love. We should find its salient features in the most ordinary lived experience.

Lacan, J., “Guiding Remarks for a Convention on Female Sexuality”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 616.

Between man and woman, there is love. This means that it bonds. A world, meanwhile, floats.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017: p. 93.

Between man and woman, there is love. This is communication at full throttle. You can see that it circulates. It pools together the flex, the influx and everything that gets added to it when one is an obsessional, for instance, oblativity, the obsessional's sensational invention. Love is here, this little ring, which is everywhere, except that there is a place at which it will turn back, and in one hell of a way. But let's stay in the first phase. Between man, on the left, and woman, on the right, there is love. It's the little ring.

***Ibid.*, p. 95.**

Well, not at all, because even so, on the left, he occupies the entire space. Therefore, what there is between him and love is precisely what's on the other side, that is, in the right-hand portion of the diagram. *Between man and love, there is a world*, which means that this covers the territory initially occupied by woman, where I have written W, in the right-hand portion. It is for this reason that the one whom we shall call man on this occasion imagines to himself that he *knows*, in the biblical sense, the world. This knowing is quite simply the sort of dream of knowledge that comes to the place of what has been labeled with the W of woman in the diagram.

***Ibid.*, p. 96.**

Love, the love that this conveys, that flows, that gushes, this is what love is, isn't it? Love, the good that a mother wishes her son, *l'(a)mur*, you just have to put brackets around the *a* to meet once more what we experience first hand on a daily basis, namely that even between mother and son, the mother's relation to castration counts a fair bit.

To get a sound idea of what love is, one should perhaps base oneself on the fact that when it is played out seriously between a man and a woman, it always entails the stake of castration. It is what castrates. What is it that files down this narrow pass of castration? This is something we shall be trying to broach along paths that ought to be somewhat rigorous. They can only be rigorous by being logical, and even topological.

***Ibid.*, p. 98.**

Between man and love, there is woman. Then it continues until it comes to an end with the *mur*. Between man and the wall, there is, precisely, *amur*, the love letter. The best thing in this curious impulse called love, which gets flattened somewhere, is the letter.

***Ibid.*, p. 108.**

Certainly I came to medicine because I had the suspicion that the relations between man and woman played a determining role in the symptoms of human beings. This gradually pushed me towards those who did not succeed, since psychosis can certainly be said to be a kind of failure in the fulfillment of what is called "love."

Lacan, J., "Yale University: Kanzer Lecture", *The Lacanian Review*, No 12 (2022): p. 46.

Still, Freud also stumbles on this point: because his allegation with respect to Eros, insofar as he opposes it to Thanatos, as the principle of "life," is that of unifying, as if, apart from a brief coiteration, one had ever seen two bodies unite into one.

Lacan, J., *Television*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 23.

The noble, the tragic, the comic, the farcical (to be plotted on a Gaussian curve), in brief, the full range of what is produced in the scene through which it is staged—the scene that severs love relations from every social bond—the full range, then, is realized—producing the fantasies through which speaking beings subsist in what they call—who knows why?—"life."

***Ibid.*, p. 38.**

There is another realm in which one can meditate upon the function of language: the stupid language of love. The latter consists – in the final spasm of ecstasy or, on the contrary, as part of the daily grind, depending on the individuals – in suddenly calling one's sexual partner by the name of a thoroughly ordinary vegetable or repugnant animal. This certainly borders on the question of the horror of anonymity.

Lacan, J., *On the Names-of-the-Father*, trans. B. Fink, London: Polity Press, 2013, pp. 18-19.

As soon as the symbolic – that which is involved when the subject is engaged in a truly human relationship – is involved, as soon as commitment is made by the subject that is expressed in the register of *I*, by an "I want" or "I love you," there is always something problematic.

***Ibid.*, p. 29.**

You emerge from this fabulous, totally impossible thing, the ancestral line, and you are born from two germ seeds that didn't have any reason to combine except for this kink that we usually call *love*. *They make love* – why, for God's sake?

Lacan, L., "The Lacanian Phenomenon", *The Lacanian Review*, No 9, 2020, p. 31.

Being in love, when it happens, happens in an entirely different way. There has to be a surprising coincidence there, because it doesn't happen with just any partner or with just any image. I have already alluded to the maximal conditions for Werther's love at first sight.

Lacan, J., *Freud's Papers on Technique: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. Forrester (New York: Norton, 1988): p. 182.

Let's try to overcome the romantic illusion, that it is perfect love, the ideal value which each of the partners acquires for the other, which upholds human commitment.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. S. Tomaselli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 260.

The love the wife gives her spouse is not directed at the individual, not even an idealized one – that's the danger of what is called life in common, idealization isn't tenable – but at a being beyond. The love which constitutes the bond of marriage, the love which properly speaking is sacred, flows from the woman towards what Proudhon calls, *all men*. Similarly, through the woman, it's *all women* which the fidelity of the husband is directed towards.

***Ibid.*, p. 260.**

Love flows towards the universal man, towards the veiled man, for whom every ideal is only an idolatrous substitute, and this is that famous genital love which makes our Sundays and which we affect to scorn.

***Ibid.*, p. 263.**

What is desired, strictly speaking, in the beloved woman is precisely what she lacks (...) At this extreme, in the most idealised love, what is sought in the woman is what she lacks. And what is sought beyond her is the object that is central to the entire libidinal economy – the phallus.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The Object Relation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, 2020, p. 102.

What is loved in love is what lies beyond the subject. It is literally what the beloved subject does not have.

***Ibid.*, p. 120.**

This necessity of centering her love not on the object but on what the object doesn't have, brings us to the heart of the love relationship as such and to the heart of the gift. And it is this something that the object doesn't have that makes the tripartite constellation of the subject's history a necessity.

***Ibid.*, p. 122.**

What intervenes in the love relationship, what is asked for as a sign of love, is only ever something that carries worth merely as a sign. Or, to go yet further, there is no greater possible gift, no greater sign of love, than the gift of what one hasn't got.

***Ibid.*, p. 132.**

The veil or curtain that hangs in front of something is still what best affords an image of this fundamental situation of love. [...] It is precisely here that man embodies and idolifies his sense of this nothing that lies beyond the love-object.

***Ibid.*, p. 147.**

Since everything depends on the Other, the solution is to have an Other of one's own. This is what we call love. In the dialectic of desire it's about having an Other of one's own.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 120.

Something has taken the place of the irruption of sex, and it's love - love that is named as such, the love that we would call naive love, ingenuous love, the love that unites two young and, in general, fairly bland people. This is what forms the pivot of the intrigue. Love plays the role of being the axis around which the entire comedy of the situation revolves, and it will remain so until the appearance of Romanticism...

***Ibid.*, p. 123.**

To love is to give to someone who has or doesn't have what is in question, but it is certainly to give what one doesn't have. To give, on the other hand, is also to give, but it is to give what one has. There's a world of difference.

***Ibid.*, p. 194.**

And it's inasmuch as he (man) is not himself either, insofar as he satisfies, that is, insofar as he obtains the Other's satisfaction, but only perceives himself as the instrument of that satisfaction, that the man finds himself in love outside his Other.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 330.

The problem of love is the problem of the profound division it introduces into the subject's activities. What is at issue for a man, following the very definition of love, 'to give what one does not have', is to give what he does not have, the phallus, to a being who is not it.

***Ibid.*, p. 330.**

But there is discordance between what there is that is absolute in the subjectivity of the Other who gives or doesn't give love and the fact that, to gain access to the Other as object of desire, it is necessary for it totally to become an object. It's in this vertiginous or nauseous, to call it by its name, gap that the difficulty of accessing sexual desire is located.

***Ibid.*, p. 364.**

I repeat, the essential question is that of the passage, attested in experience, of the love for an object to the ensuing identification. The distinction Freud introduces here between libidinal erotic attachment to the loved object and the identification with the same is no different from the one I alluded to at the end of one of our recent seminars concerning the relation to the phallus, namely, the opposition between being and having.

***Ibid.*, p. 402-403.**

They (women) know that, beyond all of love's sublimations, desire has a relationship to being, even in its most limited, restricted, fetishistic, and, in short, its stupidest form - that is, even in the marginal form in which in fantasy the subject, qua blinded, is literally nothing more than a prop and a sign, the sign of little *a* as the signifying remainder of relations with the Other.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and Its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 450.

No doubt, in talking about erotics, we will have to talk about the kind of rules of love that have been elaborated over the centuries.

Lacan, J., *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 84.

No doubt, in talking about erotics, we will have to talk about the kind of rules of love that have been elaborated over the centuries.

***Ibid.*, p. 84.**

If I wish for my spouse's happiness, I no doubt sacrifice my own, but who knows if her happiness isn't totally dissipated, too?

***Ibid.*, p. 187.**

Things are stated quite clearly here: masculinity is desirable, femininity is active. This is at any rate, how things present themselves at the moment of Love's birth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity Press, 2015, p. 121.

But it turns out that women too are in soulove (*âmoreuses*), in other words, that they soulove the soul. What can that soul be that they soulove in their partner, who is nevertheless homo to the hilt, from which they cannot get away? That can only, in effect, lead them to this final term – and it is not for nothing that I call it as I do – *υστερια*, as it is said in Greek, hysteria, namely, to play the part of the man (*faire l'homme*), as I have said, being thus *homosexual or beyondsex* themselves.

***Ibid.*, p. 85.**

One could say that the more a man believes a woman confuses him with God, in other words, what she enjoys, the less he hates (*haie*), the less he is (*est*), the less he loves.

***Ibid.*, p. 89.**

It is not for nothing that I'm always drumming it into you that to love is to give what one hasn't got. This is even the principle behind the castration complex. To have the phallus, to be able to make use of it, needs must not *be* it.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 108.

The *a* is called *a* in our discourse not merely for the algebraic function of the letter that we were promoting the other day, but, if I may say so, light-heartedly, because it's what *on n'a plus*, what we ain't got no more. This is why this *a* that in love we ain't got no more can be found again along the regressive path in identification in the form of the identification with *being* it. This is why Freud qualifies the passage from love to identification using precisely the term *regression*, but, in this regression, *remains* what it is, an instrument. It is *with* what one is that one can have or have not, as it were.

***Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.**

Only love allows jouissance to condescend to desire.

***Ibid.*, p. 179.**

Any requirement of a on the path of this enterprise to encounter woman - since I've taken the androcentric perspective - can only trigger the Other's anxiety, precisely because I don't make any more of the Other than a, because my desire ays the Other, as it were. This is precisely why sublimation-love allows jouissance to condescend to desire.

***Ibid.*, p. 180.**

On the path that condescends to my desire, what the Other wants, what he wants even if he doesn't know in the slightest what he wants, is nevertheless, necessarily, my anxiety. It is not enough to say that woman overcomes hers through love. That remains to be seen.

***Ibid.*, p. 180.**

What we ask for - it's *la petite mort* - but in the end it's clear that this is what we ask and that the drive is tightly entwined with the demand of lovemaking, to *faire l' amour* - if you will, *faire l' amourir*, to do it to death, it's even *à mourir de rire*, to die laughing - I'm not accentuating the side of love that partakes of what I call a comical mood just for the sake of it. In any case, this is precisely where the restful side of post-orgasm resides.

***Ibid.*, p. 263.**

. . . concerning what is involved in everything that is posited as sexual relation, instituting it through a sort of fiction that is called *marriage*, it would be a good rule for the psychoanalyst to tell himself on this score, *let them muddle through as best as they can*...

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: . . . or worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2023, p. 10.

La lettre d'amur? Well, here's a typical one - *I ask you to refuse me my offering*. There's a stop here, because I hope that for it to be understood there's no need to add anything. It's very precisely this, *la lettre d'amur*, the true one - *to refuse my offering*.

It can be finished off, for those who by chance might never have understood what *la lettre d'amur* is - *to refuse my offering because it isn't it*.

***Ibid.*, p. 66.**

To love to someone, has always delighted me. I mean that I regret that we speak a language in which we say *I love a woman*, in the same way as saying, *I beat her*. *To love to a woman* seems more appropriate to me. This is so even to the extent that one day I noticed - since we're in the parapraxis, let's continue - that I was writing *tu ne sauras jamais combien je t'ai aimé*. I didn't put an *e* on the end, which is a slip, a spelling mistake if you like, incontestably. On reflection, I told myself I'd written it like that because I must have felt *I love to you*. Well, this is a personal matter.

***Ibid.*, p. 69.**

The said relation [relation of one to the other or of the other to one] has absolutely nothing to do with what are commonly called *sexual relations*. We have stacks of relations to these relations. And, on these *rappports*, these relations, we also have a few little *rappports*, a few little reports. They keep us busy in our terrestrial life. However, on the level at which I position it, it's a question of grounding this relation in universals. How does the *man* universal relate to the *woman* universal? This is the question that forces itself upon us due to the fact that language demands very precisely that it should be grounded through this. Were there no such thing as language, well, there wouldn't be any question either. We wouldn't have to bring the universal into play.

***Ibid.*, p. 83.**

“Jouissance of the Other,” of the Other with a capital O, “of the body of the Other who symbolizes the Other, is not the sign of love.” [...] Love, of course, constitutes a sign (*fait signe*) and it is always mutual.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London Norton, 1999, p. 4.

Love is impotent, though mutual, because it is not aware that it is but the desire of the One, which leads us to the impossibility of establishing the relationship between “them-two (*la relation d’eux*)”. The relationship between them-two what? – them-two sexes.

***Ibid.*, p. 6.**

This “There’s such a thing as One” is not simple [...] [I]n Freud’s discourse, it is announced by the fact that Eros is defined as the fusion that makes one from two [...] But, since it is clear that even all of you [...] not only do not make one, but have no chance of pulling that off [...] Freud obviously has to bring in another factor that poses an obstacle to this universal Eros in the guise of Thanatos, the reduction to dust.

***Ibid.*, p. 66.**

The capital A is barred because there is no Other - not where something makes up for this, namely the Other as the locus of the unconscious, which I’ve just said is what man makes love with, in another sense of the word *with*, and that’s what one’s partner is - the big Other is barred because there is no Other of the Other.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 108.

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To love, you have to admit your lack, and acknowledge that you need the other, that you miss him or her. Those who think they’re complete on their own, or who want to be, don’t know how to love. And sometimes, they ascertain this painfully. They manipulate, they pull strings, but of love they know neither the risk nor the delights.

Miller, J.-A., “We love the One Who Responds to Our Question: ‘Who Am I?’” *Hurly-Burly*, No 5, March 2011, p. 178.

“Love is always reciprocal,” said Lacan. [...] This sentence gets repeated over and over without being understood, or it gets understood back to front. It doesn’t mean that it’s enough to love someone for him to love you back. That would be absurd. It means: “If I love you, it’s because you’re loveable. I’m the one that loves, but you’re also mixed up in this, because there’s a to and fro: the love I have for you is the return effect of the cause of love that you are for me. So, you’re implicated.”

***Ibid.*, p. 179.**

Not being able to rely on a signifying rapport at the sexual level, the couple relies on a relation at the level of jouissance. The definition I propose of the partner-symptom implies this: the couple relationship supposes that the Other becomes the symptom of the *parlêtre*, that is to say, a means of his or her jouissance.

Miller, J.-A., *Analysis Laid Bare*, trans. A. Duncan, New York, NY: Lacanian Press, 2023, p. 70.

There is no sexual rapport means that *parlêtres* as sexuated beings make a couple not at the level of the pure signifier, but at the level of jouissance, and this liaison is always symptomatic.

***Ibid.*, p. 72.**

To allow us to imagine this I will add, using an indication of Lacan's that the partner-symptom of the man has the form of the fetish, while that of the feminine *parlêtre* has an erotomaniac form. This can be heard in the testimonies of the pass: men first have to resolve the question of fantasy, of the fetish form that their fantasy imposes on their partner, while female *parlêtres* have first, in their analysis, to deal with the question of love, and that is what erotomania is all about.

***Ibid.*, p. 75-6.**

The feminine mode of jouissance requires that the partner speaks and loves, which is to say that love is, for her, woven into jouissance. Fundamentally the partner must be that [barred] A who is missing something and that this lack leads to talking, especially talking to her. Without doubt there has been a change in times, and it can be said that women today have more freedoms than they did before. However, this has not changed the structure.

***Ibid.*, p. 76.**

On the feminine side, the *parlêtre* imposes a completely different form on her partner, according to the illimitation of jouissance. In order to approach it, let us think of the central role of the demand for love, which plays, in feminine sexuality, a role without equivalent on the masculine side. This demand for love has in itself an absolute character, an aim at infinity—it is represented in the diagram by an unclosed circle, the whole is not formed, it does not make one. It opens up to infinity, beyond anything material that can be exchanged and all that can be offered as proof. It concerns the being of the partner, which bares its erotomaniac form: *that the Other loves me!*

***Ibid.*, p. 77.**

As far as the partner of the feminine *parlêtre* is concerned, two axioms should be kept in mind. Firstly, in order to love, one must speak. Love is inconceivable without speech. Indeed, to love is *to give what one does not have*, and one can only do this by speaking, because it is by speaking that one gives one's lack of being... Second axiom: in order to enjoy, one must love. This is really a requirement on the feminine side. I could write the sequence *speak, love, enjoy*. At the limit, on the feminine side, one can enjoy mere speech—speech about love mostly, but not only.

***Ibid.*, p. 78-9.**

Men, for their part, can enjoy without speech and without love. It is obviously a jouissance reduced to a little core.

***Ibid.*, p. 80.**

The erotomaniacal pain in the neck is the one who cannot help asking the question, *do you love me?* She scrutinizes the love of the other because she enjoys through love.

***Ibid.*, p. 80.**

The demand for love, in its potentially infinite character, loops back upon the feminine *parlêtre* in the form of ravage, as depicted in this schema [p. 81]. Ravage is the other side of love. Following the structure of the not-all, the partner-symptom becomes the *partner-*

ravage. Ravage is the return of the demand for love, just like the symptom, but with an index of infinity that distinguishes it from the classical symptom which is always localized, elementary, countable, classifiable, and whose structure is therefore masculine—one can make symptomatologies. On the feminine side, the symptom is marked by the infinity of the structure of the not-all, hence its form as *ravage*.

***Ibid.*, p. 81.**

So, let us take a look at the contemporary couple. There have certainly been extraordinary mutations in the relation between the sexes over the last twenty years. We seem to be moving towards the end of the *double standard*, which was achieved mainly in the Midwest, hence its pronunciation in English, but which is dominant everywhere. The girl was to be a virgin at her wedding and remain faithful afterwards, whereas, on the contrary, it was considered fine for the boy to make female conquests before marriage, even if it meant despising them afterwards and marrying the “good” girl. His marital infidelity, without being preached, was considered acceptable. We live in another world where female virginity has lost this value, where male infidelity and machismo are less well tolerated by the other sex, which is now intent on payback.

***Ibid.*, p. 82-3.**

Today, modern women tend to make of men an object *a*. She tells him, *you are only a means of jouissance*. This goes hand in hand with a certain devaluation of love. This is all theater! Without quoting it in detail, let us mention a sociological survey of adolescents that shows that girls continue to occupy themselves with love.

***Ibid.*, p. 83.**

It is true that girls will have sex more readily nowadays and that the proportion of virgins on their wedding day has fallen dramatically, but we still need to know why. They have sex for love. And when they play at separating sexual activity and love in order to do as boys do, it remains very problematic for them, as it does for the boys.

***Ibid.*, p. 83-4.**

In the couple relation, the woman is pushed to fetishize herself, to symptomatize herself and also to veil, mask and accentuate her semblants while she turns her partner into an [barred]A. This implies she knows nothing of her *jouissance*, that she does not know what to say about her *jouissance*. For his part, the man fetishizes the woman at the price of getting eclipsed in his fantasy. A man knows much more about his own *jouissance* than a woman knows about hers. He knows much more about the details that condition his *jouissance*, but obviously it is much less interesting.

***Ibid.*, p. 84.**

The wife of a ladies’ man does not stay by his side *in spite* of his infidelities, but *because* of them. She is proud of the phallic power of her spouse.

Miller, J.-A., “Omnia Vincit Amor” *Hurly-Burly*, No 6, September 2011, p. 212.

It appears that Hesiod was the first one to speak, in his *Theogony*, [...] of the *race of women* – *genos gynaicon*. From then on, after him, in the Greek literature of Antiquity, one speaks of women in terms of *ikelon*, which signifies *semblant*, *copy*, of *dolos*, which signifies *ruse*, of *pema*, which signifies *calamity*. This means that to slander women is something which began a very long time ago.

Miller, J.-A., Of Semblants in the Relation Between Sexes, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No. 3, p. 9.

How does [Medea] construct her revenge? [...] Her revenge will consist in killing what is most precious to [Jason], that is to say, his new wife and her own children. [...] Medea is presented as a mother who deeply loves her children. [...] She kills her own children [...] and there it is the woman who, in her, wins over the mother. [...] Lacan alludes that the act of a true woman [...] is the sacrifice of that which is the most precious to her in order to drill, in a man, a hole which will never be sealed.

***Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.**

Poor men, who don't know how to recognize the Medea in their wives!

***Ibid.*, p. 17.**

The 'Lacanian' man is fundamentally fearful. And if he goes to war, it is to escape from women, to escape from the hole. Thus, men are not without semblants, but they are there in order to protect their little having.

***Ibid.*, p. 17.**

Having is clearly linked to masturbation. Phallic jouissance is, par excellence, a jouissance of ownership. This means that the subject does not give the key to the till to anyone, and this may go as far as a subject protecting himself by means of impotence, and he even derives satisfaction from it. And when, finally, it happens that he gives, it is as if he was the victim of a theft to such an extent that he retains his masturbation as a bonus, as a shelter for a jouissance all for himself – One for her, one for me.

***Ibid.*, p. 18.**

Some women utter these perpetual vows of obedience, chastity and poverty. These vows frame the jouissance beyond the phallus. They signify that no man can be introduced at this level of jouissance and that only God is equal to the task.

***Ibid.*, p. 20.**

What can be translated of the crossing of the fantasy in Freudian terms is a certain modification, understood as a flexibilization of the condition of love which governs object-choices.

***Ibid.*, p. 24.**

The dependence on a love object, on a sexual object, on a particular erotic object, is very annoying and bothersome; which is why men throw themselves backwards towards philanthropy. It is easier to love everyone than to love a single woman.

Miller, J.-A., "Of Women and Semblants," *The Lacanian Review*, No 13, 2022, p. 53.

It is amusing to read in Freud's own writings that he places himself on the side of the *not all*. *Not all* individuals deserve love.

***Ibid.*, p. 53.**

Lacan formulated in the register of 'feminine madness', what amongst women is the erotomaniacal style of love and not fetishistic; amongst men the fetish is the limit. Basically men are satisfied with little, it's well known, in contrast to the feminine pole that does not have that limit.

***Ibid.*, p. 57.**

This is above all what Sachs underlines. It depends on the encounter, on love. Here, on the side of man, the relation to the limit is structural; there, on the side of woman, the relation to the limit obtains through love.

Miller, J.-A., “Of Distribution Between the sexes,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 11, 2003, p. 19.

These two forms of *jouissance*, a distribution which covers the very experience of the body, also account for the two forms of love distinguished by Lacan as fetishistic and erotomaniac – and behind this word ‘love’ we must hear the Freudian *Liebe*, in other words, love, desire and *jouissance* all rolled into a single word.

***Ibid.*, p. 23.**

This is how it can appear that man would have *jouissance* and that woman would have love. There is something of this in the difference between the object-fetish and the object of erotomania. It is better to say that on the side of woman love is woven with *jouissance* and that they are in some way non-dissociable.

***Ibid.*, p. 25.**

What they called ‘feminine sexuality’ – and justifiable so because this was the angle from which they had access to it – is a sexuality which has object lack at its centre, as its linchpin.

Miller, J.-A., “On the Nature of Semblants – Lacanian Clinic,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 20, 2010, p. 35.

Moreover, it is a position that allows Lacan to give a paradoxical rereading of the *anacletic* position, turning the *anacletic* position distinguished by Freud himself into the erotic position in the man, the position that assures him that, as trustee of the phallus, the woman depends on him.

***Ibid.*, p. 37.**

It is in this sense that is a *jouissance* which requires that one pass via love, while *jouissance* on the male side does not require that it pass via love, it does not require the *jouissance* of speech.

Miller, J.-A., “Of Distribution Between the Sexes,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 11, 2003., p. 26.

LAURENT

What is fascinating in cases of women as they often present is that it is the subject of love who suffers at all levels; the relation of the couple occupies a place more or less remarkable and constant, much more than in the complaints of men who characteristically have no complaints on this point. As Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed out, what men speak about is the mistake they have made in the choice of couple, that it is not the right choice of couple; they speak about a deficit produced in the couple by this error and in *jouissance* as well: with another woman they might perhaps dream of better perspectives on *jouissance*. That is how it is, particularly in our time where the women occupy the place of the superego, and all the more in that the Other does not exist. What gets reinforced for both sexes is the necessity to

enjoy embodied by the feminine exigency which, liberated, that is from the phallic organ, can go much further in embodying the identification with the object *a* and with the exigencies of a *jouissance* that has to be sought.

Laurent, E., “The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Today”, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 8 (2002): p. 103.

For that reason they can go further than men along the paths of devotion in love, and it's the reason why Lacan prefers to the term 'masochism' the term 'ravage' that a man can on occasion inflict on a woman. It's not that women are masochistic but because there is no limit, no barrier placed by the threat of castration.

Laurent, E., “Feminine Positions of Being”, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 5, 2001, p. 56-57.

LOVE, KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH



Caravaggio, *Medusa*

FREUD

[...] the part of the patient's emotional life which he can no longer recall to memory is re-experienced by him in relation to the physician; and it is only this re-experiencing in the 'transference' that convinces him of existence and of the power of these unconscious sexual impulses. His symptoms, to take an analogy from chemistry, are precipitates of earlier experiences in the sphere of love (in the widest sense of the word), and it is only in the raised temperature of his experience of the transference that they can be resolved and reduced to other physical products.

Freud, S., "Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis: Fifth Lecture" (1909), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 51.

Transference arises spontaneously in all human relationships just as it does between the patient and the physician. It is everywhere the true vehicle for therapeutic influence; and the less its presence is suspected, the more powerfully it operates.

***Ibid.*, p. 51.**

He must recognize that the patient's falling in love is induced by the analytic situation and is not to be attributed to the charms of his own person; so that he has no grounds whatever for being proud of such a 'conquest', as it would be called outside analysis. And it is always well to be reminded of this.

Freud, S., "Observations on Transference Love" (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 160-161.

There can be no doubt that the outbreak of a passionate demand for love is largely the work of resistance.

***Ibid.*, p. 162.**

I shall state it as a fundamental principle that the patient's need and longing should be allowed to persist in her, in order that they may serve as forces impelling her to do work and to make changes, and that we must beware of appeasing those forces by means of surrogates.
Ibid., p. 165.

He must keep firm hold of the transference-love, but treat it as something unreal, as a situation which has to be gone through in the treatment and traced back to its unconscious origins and which must assist in bringing all that is most deeply hidden in the patient's erotic life into her consciousness and therefore under her control.
Ibid., p. 166.

Can we truly say that the state of being in love which becomes manifest in analytic treatment is not a real one?
Ibid., p. 168.

Everything in the sphere of this first attachment to the mother seemed to me so difficult to grasp in analysis—so gray with age and shadowy and almost impossible to revivify—that it was as if it had succumbed to an especially inexorable repression.
Freud, S., "Female Sexuality" (1931), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI, London: Hogarth Press, 1961. p. 226.

Identification is most frequently used in hysteria to express a common sexual element. A hysterical woman identifies herself in her symptoms most readily—though not exclusively—with people with whom she has had sexual relations or with people who have had sexual relations with the same people as herself".
Freud, S., "Interpretation of Dreams" (1900), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume IV, London: Hogarth Press, 1961. p. 150.

These reproductions, which emerge with such unwished-for exactitude, always have as their subject some portion of infantile sexual life—of the Oedipus complex, that is, and its derivatives; and they are invariably acted out in the sphere of the transference, of the patient's relation to the physician.
Freud, S., "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 18.

Patients repeat all of these unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference and revive them with the greatest ingenuity. They seek to bring about the interruption of the treatment while it is still incomplete; they contrive once more to feel themselves scorned, to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and treat them coldly; they discover appropriate objects for their jealousy; instead of the passionately desired baby of their childhood, they produce a plan or a promise of some grand present—which turns out as a rule to be no less unreal.
Ibid., p. 21.

Now object-love itself presents us with a second example of a similar polarity—that between love (or affection) and hate (or aggressiveness), If only we could succeed in relating these

two polarities to each other and in deriving one from the other! From the very first we recognized the presence of a sadistic component in the sexual instinct.

***Ibid.*, p. 53.**

Her illness was therefore a demonstration of her love for K., just as his wife's was a demonstration of her dislike. It was only necessary to suppose that her behavior had been the opposite of Frau K.'s and that she had been ill when he was absent and well when he had come back.

Freud, S., "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 39.

Thus, in Dora's case we shall not content ourselves with a psycho-analytic interpretation of her attacks of coughing and aphonia; but we shall also indicate the organic factor which was the source of the 'somatic compliance' that enabled her to express her love for a man who was periodically absent.

***Ibid.*, p. 41.**

For behind Dora's supervalent train of thought which was concerned with her father's relations with Frau K. there lay concealed a feeling of jealousy which had that lady as its object – a feeling, that is, which could only be based upon an affection on Dora's part for one of her own sex.

***Ibid.*, p. 60.**

Incapacity for meeting a *real* erotic demand is one of the most essential features of a neurosis. Neurotics are dominated by the opposition between reality and phantasy. If what they long for the most intensely in their phantasies is presented to them in reality, they nonetheless flee from it; and they abandon themselves to their phantasies the most readily where they need no longer fear to see them realized.

***Ibid.*, p. 110.**

The same overvaluation spreads over into the psychological sphere: the subject becomes, as it were, intellectually infatuated (that is, his powers of judgement are weakened) by the mental achievements and perfections of the sexual object and he submits to the latter's judgements with credulity. Thus the credulity of love becomes an important, if not the most fundamental, source of authority.

Freud, S., "Three Essays on Sexuality (1905)", *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 150.

On the other hand an adult who has become neurotic owing to his libido being unsatisfied behaves in his anxiety like a child: he begins to be frightened when he is alone, that is to say when he is away from someone of whose love he had felt secure, and he seeks to assuage this fear by the most childish measures.

***Ibid.*, p. 224.**

In our type, on the other hand, the libido has remained attached to the mother for so long, even after the onset of puberty, that the maternal characteristics remain stamped on the love-objects that are chosen later, and all these turn into easily recognizable mother-surrogates. The comparison with the way in which the skull of a newly born child is shaped springs to

mind at this point: after a protracted labour it always takes the form of a cast of the narrow part of the mother's pelvis.

Freud, S., “A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men (1910)”, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 169.

Then comes everything that we have summarized as “real frustration”—the misfortunes of life from which arise deprivation of love, poverty, family quarrels, ill-judged choice of partner in marriage, unfavourable social circumstances, and the strictness of ethical standards to whose pressure the individual is subject.

Freud, S., “Transference” in *Introductory Lectures On Psychoanalysis* (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 432.

If those concerned are a young girl and a youngish man, we shall get the impression of a normal case of falling in love; we shall find it understandable that a girl would fall in love with a man with whom she can be much alone and talk of intimate things and who has the advantage of having met her as a helpful superior; and we shall probably overlook the fact that what we should probably expect from a neurotic girl would rather be an impediment in her capacity to love.

***Ibid.*, p. 441.**

transference can appear as a passionate demand for love or in more moderate forms, in place of a wish to be loved, a wish can emerge between a girl and an old man to be received as a favourite daughter.

***Ibid.*, p. 441.**

But when a similar affectionate attachment by the patient to the doctor is repeated regularly in every new case, when it comes to light again and again, under the most unfavorable conditions and where there are positively grotesque incongruities, even in elderly women, and in relation to grey-bearded men, even where, in our judgement, there is nothing of any kind to entice—then we must abandon the idea of chance disturbance and recognize that we are dealing with a phenomenon which is intimately bound up with the nature of the illness itself. This new fact, which we thus recognize so unwillingly, is known by us as *transference*

***Ibid.*, p. 441-442.**

In the absence of such a transference, or if it is a negative one, the patient would never even give a hearing to the doctor and his arguments. In this his belief is repeating the story of its own development; it is a derivative of love and, to start with, needed no arguments.”

***Ibid.*, p. 445.**

LACAN

We must, nevertheless, bring out the subject's aggressiveness toward us, because, as we know, aggressive intentions form the negative transference that is the inaugural knot of the analytic drama.

Lacan, J., “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London, Norton, 2006, p. 87.

For if love is giving what you don't have, it is certainly true that the subject can wait to be given it, since the psychoanalyst has nothing else to give him. But he does not even give him this nothing, and it is better that way—which is why he is paid for this nothing, preferably well paid, in order to show that otherwise it would not be worth much.

Lacan, J., “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London, Norton, 2006, p. 516.

Here is the exit that allows us to leave suggestion behind. Identification with the object as a regression, because it begins with the demand for love, opens up the sequence of transference (opens it up, not closes it) — that is, the pathway by which the identifications that punctuate this regression by stopping it can be exposed.

Lacan, J., “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London, Norton, 2006, p. 531.

The fact that Freud included love in it [transference] is something that must clearly show us to what degree he gave symbolic relations their full range at the human level. Indeed, if we were to bestow a meaning on love – a borderline experience we can barely speak about – it would be the total conjunction of reality and symbols, which constitute one and the same thing.

Lacan, J., *On the Names-of-the-Father*, trans. B. Fink, London: Polity Press, 2013, p. 48.

A permanence that consists solely in the quadruple agency by which each drive is sustained through coexistence with three others. It is only as power that four opens onto the disunion that must be warded off, for those whom sex is not sufficient to render partners.

Lacan, J., *Televisión*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 25.

Rather, she is a party to the perversion which is, I maintain, Man's [*L'homme*]. Which leads her into the familiar masquerade that is not just the lie of which some ingrates, themselves clinging to the role of Man [*L'homme*], accuse her. Rather, she prepares herself on-the-off-chance, so that her inner fantasy of Man [*L'homme*] will find its hour of truth. That's not excessive, since truth is already woman insofar as it's not-all, unable, in any case, to be wholly-spoken.

***Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.**

But that is why truth is more often than not standoffish, demanding of love sexual pretences that it can't fulfill, misfiring—sure as clockwork.

***Ibid.*, p. 41.**

What our practice reveals is that knowledge, unconscious knowledge, has a relationship with love.

Lacan, J., *On Hysteria* (1977), *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 21, trans. N. Wulfing, 2010, p. 14.

In his quest, Alcibiades spills the beans regarding love's deception and its baseness (to love is to want to be loved) to which he was willing to consent.

Lacan, J., “On Freud's ‘Trieb’ and the Analyst's Desire”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 723.

Socrates, as the precursor of psychoanalysis and confident of his position at this fashionable gathering, does not hesitate to name Agathon as the transference object, bringing to light through an interpretation a fact that many analysts are still unaware of: that the love-hate effect in the psychoanalytic situation is found outside of it.

Lacan, J., “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 699.

Now, you will be well aware of the great distance which separates – resistance, which keeps the subject from this full speech which analysis awaits from him, and which is a function of that anxiogenic inflection constituted, in its most radical mode, at the level of symbolic exchange, by the transference—from this phenomenon which we handle in a technical manner in analysis and which seems to us to be the driving force, as Freud put it, of the transference, namely love.

Lacan, J., *Freud's Papers on Technique: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York: Norton, 1988, p. 89-90.

The structure of this artificial phenomenon which is transference and that of the spontaneous phenomenon we call love, and more specifically passionate love, are, on the plane of the psychic, equivalent.

***Ibid.*, p. 90.**

The conjoiner, the marriage-broker, conjoins on a completely different plane than that of reality, since the plane of an engagement, of love, has nothing to do with reality.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. S. Tomaselli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 234.

The inverted Oedipus complex is never absent from the function of the Oedipus complex - I mean, the element of love for the father cannot be avoided. It's what brings the Oedipus complex to an end, its dissolution, in a dialectic that remains very ambiguous between love and identification, identification as rooted in love.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 154.

Identification and love, these are not the same thing - one can identify with someone without loving them, and vice versa - but the two terms are nevertheless closely tied to and absolutely indissociable from one another.

***Ibid.*, p. 154-155.**

Demand, merely by virtue of being articulated as a demand, even when it isn't a demand for the Other, explicitly establishes the Other as absent or present, and as giving or not giving this presence. That is, demand is fundamentally a demand for love - a demand for what is nothing, no particular satisfaction, a demand for what the subject brings purely and simply by responding to the demand.

***Ibid.*, p. 361.**

Every desire in its pure state is something that, uprooted from the soil of needs, assumes the form of an absolute condition in relation to the Other. It's the margin or result of the subtraction, as it were, of the requirements of need from the demand for love. Conversely,

desire presents itself as what, in the demand for love, rebels against being reduced to a need, because in reality it satisfies nothing other than itself, that is, desire as an absolute condition.
***Ibid.*, p. 362.**

There is, on the one hand, the position of the Other as Other, as the locus of speech, to whom demand is addressed and whose radical irreducibility manifests itself in the fact that it can give love, that is, something that is all the more totally gratuitous because there is no support for love, since, as I have been telling you, to give one's love is to give nothing of what one has, for it's precisely insofar as one doesn't have it that love is at issue.
***Ibid.*, p. 364.**

It's in the virtual space between the appeal for satisfaction and the demand for love that desire has to assume its place and be organized.
***Ibid.*, p. 384.**

To call things by their name, it's because the patient has come to love us that our interpretations are ingested. We're on the plane of suggestion. Now, of course, Freud does not intend to limit himself to that.
***Ibid.*, p. 405.**

The first is the ideal of human love. Do I need to emphasize the role that we attribute to a certain idea of "love fulfilled"? That is an expression you must have learned to recognize and not only here, since, in truth, there is hardly an analyst who writes who has not drawn attention to it. And you know that I have often taken aim at the approximative and vague character, so tainted with an optimistic moralism, which marks the original articulations taking the form of the genitalization of desire. That is the ideal of genital love - a love that is supposed to be itself alone the model of a satisfying object relation: doctor-love, I would say if I wanted to emphasize in a comical way the tone of this ideology; love as hygiene, I would say, to suggest what analytical ambition seems to be limited to here.

Lacan, J., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 8.

Analysis has brought a very important change of perspective on love by placing it at the centre of ethical experience; it has also brought an original note, which was certainly different from the way in which love had previously been viewed by the moralists and the philosophers in the economy of inter-human relations. Why then has analysis not gone further in the direction of the investigation of what should properly be called an erotics? That is something that deserves reflection.

***Ibid.*, p. 8-9.**

What the analyst has to give, unlike the partner in the act of love, is something that even the most beautiful bride in the world cannot outmatch, that is to say, what he has. And what he has is nothing other than his desire, like that of the analysand, with the difference that it is an experienced desire.

What can a desire of this kind, the desire of the analyst, be? We can say right away what it cannot be. It cannot desire the impossible.

***Ibid.*, p. 300.**

Indeed, people have done nothing but speak of love in analytic discourse. How can one help but sense that, with respect to everything that can be articulated now that scientific discourse

has been discovered, it is purely and simply a waste of time? What analytic discourse contributes – and perhaps that is, after all, the reason for its emergence at a certain point in scientific discourse – is that to speak of love is in itself a *jouissance*.

***Ibid.*, p. 83.**

The soul's existence can thus be thrown into question (*mise en cause*) – that's the right term with which to ask whether it's not an effect of love. In effect, as long as the soul soulloves the soul (*l'âme aime l'âme*), sex is not involved. Sex doesn't count here. The elaboration from which the soul results is "homosexual" [*homosexuelle*], as is perfectly legible in history.

***Ibid.*, p. 84.**

What I will willingly write for you today as "*hainamoration*" is the depth (*relief*) psychoanalysis was able to introduce in order to situate the zone of its experience. [...] Freud arms himself with Empedocles' statement that God must be the most ignorant of all beings, since he does not know hatred [...] It is here that analysis reminds us that one knows nothing of love without hate.

***Ibid.*, p. 90-91.**

It is to the extent that we can home in on (...) the status of love in society, a precarious status, a threatened status, and to come right out with it, a clandestine status – that we can appreciate why and how, in the most protected context of all, that of the analyst's office, the status of love becomes even more paradoxical.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity Press, 2015, p. 15.

We can do no better, in this regard, than to begin with an investigation of what the phenomenon of transference is supposed to imitate to the greatest extent, even to the point of becoming indistinguishable from it – namely love.

***Ibid.*, p. 38.**

Isn't it essentially what the *erastes* or lover is lacking that characterizes him (...) he knows not in what he is lacking (...) hasn't the *eromenos* or loved object always been situated as the one who knows not what he has, what he has that is hidden, and which makes him appealing?

***Ibid.*, p. 39.**

Love as a signifier – for to us it is a signifier and nothing else – is a metaphor, assuming that we have come to understand metaphor as substitution. It is insofar as the function of *erastes* or the person who loves, as a lacking subject comes to take the place of or is substituted for, the function of *eromenos*, the loved object, that the signification of love is produced.

***Ibid.*, p. 40.**

What sparks off the movement involved in the access to the other that love gives us is the desire of the beloved object, which I would compare, if I wished to illustrate it, to a hand that reaches out to pick a fruit when it is ripe, to draw close a rose which has opened, or to stir a fire, the logs of which suddenly burst into flames.

***Ibid.*, p. 51.**

Eryximachus tells us, (...) that "medicine is the science of the erotics of bodies," *ἐπιστήμη των του σώματος ερωτικών* (*epistémē ton tou sōmatos erotikón*). No better definition, can, it seems to me, be given to psychoanalysis.

***Ibid.*, p. 71.**

[love] is at the same level and of the same quality as δόξα (*doxa*) (...) It lies between *episteme* and ἀμάθεια (*amathia*) [ignorance], just as it lies between the beautiful and the ugly.

***Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.**

Socrates can only locate himself in his knowledge here by showing that there can be no discourse on love but from the point at which he did not know. But at the same time, we have proof that this is not what allows us to grasp what takes place in love relations either.

***Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.**

Everything in Socrates behavior indicates that his refusal to enter into the game of love is closely related to the fact, posited at the outset as the point of departure, that he knows.

***Ibid.*, p. 153.**

We cannot understand anything about transference if we do not know that it is also the consequence of this love, this present love, and analysts must keep this in mind in the course of analysis. This love is present in different ways, but they should at least remember this when it is visibly there. Contingent on this, let's say, real love, the central question of transference is established, the question the subject asks himself concerning the ἀγαλμα, namely, what he lacks, because he loves with this lack.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 108.

This is knowledge of which he who is prepared, in advance, to be the product of the psychoanalysis and's cogitations, that is, the psychoanalyst, makes himself the underwriter [*gage*], the hostage-insofar as, as this product, he is in the end destined to become a loss, to be eliminated from the process.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London Norton, 2007, p. 38.

The love of truth is the love of this weakness whose veil we have lifted, it's the love of what truth hides, which is called castration.

***Ibid.*, p. 52.**

Fortunately, in giving Dora these satisfactions of being interested in what he felt as her demand, her demand for love, he didn't take, as is customary, the mother's place.

***Ibid.*, p. 99.**

And finally, we must not forget that the analytic relationship is based on a love of truth-that is, on a recognition of reality-and that it precludes any kind of sham or deceit.

***Ibid.*, p. 166.**

It is worth noting that I put psychoanalysts on their guard, by connoting this locus they are engaged to through their knowledge as 'love.' I would say to them straight away: one does not marry truth; there can be no contract with her, and even less can there be any open liaison. She won't stand for any of that. Truth is firstly a seduction, intended to deceive you.

***Ibid.*, pp. 184 – 185.**

There is no such thing as sexual relation is proposed, therefore, as a truth. I've already said, however, that truth can only come midday. So, what I'm saying is that, all in all, what the other half says is worse. How much simpler things would be if there were no worse!

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2023, pp. 4-5.

MILLER

The analyst too is suspicious when it comes to the love of the neighbor, does not accept the ideals of sublimation for what they pretend to be.

Miller, J.-A., "Of Women and Semblants", *The Lacanian Review*, No 13, 2022, p. 6.

Lacan said – *it is towards the one to whom one supposes knowledge that one directs love.*

Miller, J.-A., "Of Distribution Between the sexes", *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 11, 2003, p. 26.

...the mainspring of the analytic experience is love. It's a question of that automatic and more often than not unconscious love that the analysand brings to the analyst, called transference. It's a contrived love, but it's made of the same stuff as true love. It sheds light on its mechanism: love addressed to the one you think knows your true truth. But love allows you to think this truth will be likeable, agreeable, when in fact it's rather hard to bear.

Miller, J.-A., "We love the One Who Responds to Our Question: 'Who Am I?'" *Hurly-Burly*, No 5, March 2011, p. 177.

Lacan says, for example: the love of truth is never anything but the love of castration. But it is also for this that he says, because this obviously has two faces, he surprises us by saying that truth is the sister of jouissance. They are both sisters, but truth might be the sister of jouissance as it is forbidden or lacking.

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis Stripped Bare By Its Bachelors", *Bulletin of the NLS*, No. 1, 2007, p. 93.

Analytical transference is made of the same stuff as true love—for whatever the truth is worth. It is made of the same fabric, that is, of a fabric of being. Love does not give you access to existence, only to being. That is why one imagines that eternal being requires your love. This gives rise to the suspicion that if you loved them a little less, it might be less eternal.

Miller, J.-A., "The One is Letter", trans. A. Duncan, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 37/38, Autumn/ Winter 2021, p. 39-40.

LAURENT

Starting with the symptoms of hysterics, Freud came to recognise the path by which the perturbation of the body occurs. Through words, it performs a new slicing and making out of the paths by which jouissance arises. The axis around which hysterical symptoms revolve is formed by the love for the father. This is what keeps the hysteric's body always on the brink of coming apart. It is what forms its *handle*, to use Lacan's expression.

Laurent, E., "Speaking through One's Symptom, Speaking through One's Body", *Hurly-Burly*, No 11, May 2014, p. 139.

Participative identification implies a partner: in twos. [...] This 'two' is not only the bond between the hysteric and her interpretand; it also designates the fact that she takes a symptom from the other whom she loves. The example that Freud gives [...] is that of Dora's aphonia [...] what she took to be the jouissance of her father performing cunnilingus on Frau K. This father is the love object, but this love implies participating in jouissance.

***Ibid.*, p. 145.**

Lacan does not speak of the collapse of the Other, but of the Name-of-the-Father. [...] according to Schreber's expression, [...] "God is a whore", in other words a partner of jouissance. This reformulation is a reduction, which is key to handling transference with a partner of jouissance without the guarantee of the Name-of-the-Father.

Laurent, E., "Disruption of Jouissance in the Madness under Transference" in *The Lacanian Review*, No 6, Fall 2018, p. 170.

[...] to know of the aporias of love and jouissance in the proximity of one's fellow man, condemns us neither to cynicism, nor to immobility, nor to the recognition of the irreducible presence of hatred or evil.

***Ibid.*, p. 176.**

Eros is without a doubt a powerful god and has to be taken seriously. But let's say that it is not till after the crossing of the fantasy that one gains the freedom to consecrate oneself to new love but one has responsibilities a little more clearly established about what one can do with a love which is always a love with limits, not without limits, a love with the same limits as our relation to truth or to the real, that is, a relation to bits of the truth or bits of the real.

Laurent, E., "The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Today", *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, No 8 (2002), p. 95.

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